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Abstract
We study the Ramsey policy problem in an economy in which firms face a collateral con-
straint. Issuing more public debt alleviates this friction by increasing the aggregate quantity of
collateral. In so doing, however, the issuance of more debt also raises interest rates, which in
turn increases the tax burden of servicing the entire outstanding debt. We first document how
this trade-off upsets the optimality of tax smoothing and, in contrast to the standard paradigm,
helps induce a unique and stable steady-state level of debt in the deterministic version of the
model. We next study the optimal policy response to fiscal and financial shocks in the stochastic
version. We finally show how the results extend to a variant model in which the financial friction
aﬄicts consumers rather than firms.
∗We are grateful to Pedro Teles for his illuminating comments in discussing our paper at the 2012 Hydra Conference
in Corsica, and to various seminar participants for useful feedback. Angeletos and Diba thank the University of Bern
for its hospitality.
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has been associated with a large increase in the demand for public debt.
For example, the quantity of treasury (and agency) securities in commercial bank portfolios increased
from 1.11 USD trillion in July 2008 to 1.79 trillion in July 2012. At the same time, interest rates
across all maturities of public debt have fallen sharply—with the yield, for instance, on newly issued
10-year Treasuries going down from 4% to 1.53%, a historically low.1
These patters are consistent with a class of models in which the “natural rate of interest” de-
creases when credit gets tighter. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)
and Buera and Nicolini (2012) have used such models to explain why the zero lower bound on
monetary policy has become binding and aggregate demand is accordingly depressed. These mod-
els, however, also predict that the issuance of more public debt helps alleviate the credit friction,
in effect permitting private agents to borrow against future income (Woodford, 1990; Aiyagari
and McGrattan, 1994). In a similar vein, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that public-debt is-
suance increases the aggregate collateral in the economy, while Stein (2011) and Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) claim that government bonds command a premium against other assets
because they serve as a special form of collateral, or medium of exchange, in financial markets.2
These considerations raise an elementary policy question: what is the optimal dynamic pattern
of taxes, deficits, and public-debt issuance if public debt facilitates private liquidity?
To address this question, we modify the standard Ramsey policy paradigm (Barro, 1979, Lucas
and Stokey, 1983) by introducing a financial friction, which in turn can be amended by public-debt
issuance.3 We then study how this modification matters for some quintessential predictions of the
Ramsey paradigm, such as those regarding the optimality of tax smoothing and the determinacy of
the steady-state level of public debt. We finally study the optimal policy response to two types of
shocks that are relevant in the context of the great recession as well as more broadly: fiscal shocks
(higher government speeding) and financial shocks (tighter private credit).
Our baseline model assumes that the liquidity role of public debt emerges in the production
side of the economy, in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). In particular, the economy
is populated by a large number of agents, each running a firm. Importantly, firms are subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Consequently, capital must be reallocated in each period from the
relatively less productive firms to the relatively more productive ones. This reallocation, however,
is hindered by a financial friction.
1Similar increases in the demand for safe, public debt were seen throughout the world. For instance, nominal,
short term rates on new issues of Swiss public debt even became briefly negative in 2011.
2What is more, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) provide evidence that this premium is positive, as
well as that the government is effectively facing a downward slopping demand for the liquidity services of public debt.
3Like much of the Ramsey literature, our framework abstracts from sticky prices, Keynesian multipliers, and the
like. Whether such effects are relevant in practice or not, they are not central to our contribution.
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To rent additional capital, the more productive firms must raise external funds in the form of
collateralized borrowing. Both own capital and holdings of government bonds can serve as collateral,
but the entrepreneur’s future income cannot be pledged. This implies that the collateral constraint
is binding as long as the agent’s net worth is low enough. When this is the case, an agent’s valuation
of public debt embeds the shadow value of relaxing her collateral constraint. In equilibrium, this
means that interest rate on public debt is lower than the underlying discount rate in preferences.
We henceforth refer to this wedge as the “liquidity premium” on public debt.4
As long as the financial friction binds, the allocation of capital is suboptimal, output and em-
ployment are below potential, and interest rates are depressed. At the same time, aggregate savings
may be higher because of a particular type of precautionary motive: agents find it optimal to save
more than what it would have been save in the absence of the friction in order to relax the likely bite
of future collateral constraints. The financial friction therefore distorts not only the intra-temporal
allocation of resources but also inter-temporal consumption and saving decisions.
Issuing more public debt helps mitigate all these distortions by increasing the aggregate collateral
that firm owners can hold and pledge in the future. Relative to the standard Ramsey problem, this
represents a novel welfare gain from issuing more debt. There is, however, a novel welfare cost as
well: by relaxing the bite of the financial friction, the issuance of more debt also reduces the liquidity
premium, which in turn raises interest-rate costs on the entire outstanding (inframarginal) quantity
of public debt. The properties of optimal taxation and debt management in our model are pinned
down by the interaction of this novel trade off with the familiar tax-smoothing considerations.
We start by studying the deterministic version of the model and showing that the aforementioned
trade off induces a unique and globally stable steady state: no matter the initial conditions, the level
of debt converges to a unique long-run value. This is in contrast to the standard paradigm (Lucas
and Stokey, 1983, Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1988) where optimality requires tax distortions
to be perfectly smoothed across periods, implying that the long-run level of debt, as well as the
associated taxes and allocations, move one-to-one with the initial level of debt. In our model, by
contrast, the Ramsey planner deviates from tax smoothing and chooses the long-run level of debt so
as to strike an optimal, long-run balance between the premium he receives for the collateral value
of public debt and the level of the financial friction he tolerates in the economy.
In particular, suppose that the initial level of public debt happens to be sufficiently high so that
the collateral constraint does not bind and the liquidity-driven demand for public debt is saturated.
Starting from this point, the Ramsey planner finds it optimal to gradually reduce the level of debt
and eventually bring the economy to a region where the collateral constraint binds. By doing so,
he aggravates the financial friction, but he also reduces the interest-rate costs of serving the debt.
4Note that our notion of the liquidity premium is no necessarily the same as the one often used in finance: what
matters for our result is the wedge between the interest rate on public debt and the discount rate that shows up in
welfare, not the wedge between, say, government bonds and corporate bonds.
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Conversely, if the initial level of public debt is lower than the steady-state target, the welfare cost
of the financial friction dominates the tax friction, and makes it optimal for the planner to issue
more public debt in order to relax the tightness of the financial friction.
We then study a stochastic version of our model in which the government can issue only non-
contingent debt. The relevant benchmark here is Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Sepala (2002),
henceforth AMSS. This is essentially a micro-founded version of Barro (1978) or, equivalently, an
incomplete-markets version of Lucas and Stokey (1983). In that model, optimal tax smoothing gives
rise to a martingale component in the optimal allocations and optimal taxes. At the same time, a
precautionary motive emerges, in the sense that the government asymptotically accumulates a large
asset position (i.e., debt becomes negative). In our model, by contrast, the aforementioned trade
off introduces mean reversion in the optimal dynamics; in the long run, debt hovers around the
steady-state level of the deterministic version of the model. In short, the empirically unappealing
long-run properties of AMSS disappear once public debt has a liquidity function.
We next analyze the optimal policy response to fiscal shocks. Consider, for instance, a permanent
increase in government spending. In the standard paradigm, it is optimal to finance this increase
with an immediate and equally-sized increase in taxes, so that the level of deficits and debt remain
unchanged. In our setting, instead, it is optimal to front load the financing of the shock, run
surpluses in the short run, and converge to a lower level of public debt in the long run. By doing so,
the planner effectively “starves the economy for liquidity” in order to raise the liquidity premium,
reduce interest-rate costs, and mitigate the overall tax burden of a bigger government.
Finally, consider a shock that seems relevant from the perspective of the recent financial crisis,
namely, a shock that tightens the collateral constraint.5 This shock depresses economic activity,
raises liquidity premia, and lowers interest rates, much in line with the the typical financial shocks
employed in the recent macroeconomic literature on financial frictions. The optimal policy response
is to lower taxes, run a deficit, and issue more public debt. This, however, is not simply because it
is “cheap to borrow” during the crisis: when lower interest rates reflect changes in the underlying
intertemporal MRS, they do not justify deviations from tax smoothing. Rather, it is because
these lower rates signal an increase in the tightness of the financial friction and an increase in the
associated wedge between the underlying intertemporal MRS and the market price of public debt.
Issuing more debt is the means to increase the aggregate collateral and mitigate the financial shock.
This clarifies the precise way in which counter-cyclical debt management is optimal.
We conclude the paper by studying a variant model in which the financial friction operates on
the consumer side of the economy. The key friction here is the same as in Bewley-type models (e.g.,
Aiyagari, 1994, Guirrieri and Lorenzoni, 2012): consumers face idiosyncratic shocks and borrowing
5This shock can be modelled either an an exogenous reduction in private collateral, as in, say, Buera and Moll
(2012), Guerreri and Lorenzoni (2012), and Kahn and Thomas (2011), or as an increase in firm heterogeneity, as in
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012). We follow the former approach but the latter gives similar results.
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constraints. We only follow a similar modeling trick as in Lagos and Wright (2005) in order to shut
down the role of the wealth distribution as a state variable and simplify the planner’s problem.
This variant model changes the theoretical micro-foundations the liquidity services of public
debt. Yet, it produces no essential differences with regard to our earlier policy conclusions. This
Bewley-like variant therefore helps illustrate the broader applicability of our insights; it also facili-
tates a sharper connection to the literature on the Friedman rule, which we discuss below.
Related literature. Our paper can be seen as a hybrid of AMSS, Woodford (1990), and
Holmostrom and Tirole (1998). We share with AMSS the same methodological backbone, namely
the Ramsey policy paradigm with linear labor-income taxation and short-term non-contingent debt.
At the same time, we adapt the insight of Woodford (1990) and Holmostrom and Tirole (1998) that
public-debt issuance can facilitate private liquidity. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the
first to embed this insight in the Ramsey paradigm and study its implications for optimal policy.
By adding capital to AMSS, our paper also connects to Farhi (2010). But whereas that paper
studies optimal capital taxation, our paper abstracts from it and instead introduces a friction in
the allocation of capital. This permits us to focus on our preferred policy questions, while also
keeping the analysis more directly comparable to AMSS and Barro (1979). For similar reasons,
we also preclude the government from issuing multiple maturities. Allowing it to do so could help
the government hedge against shocks to its budget, as in Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini
(2004), but would not affect the essence of our results. Finally, if we were to allow the planner
to make positive lump-sum transfers, we could also reinterpret our results in terms of the optimal
dynamic pattern of transfers, in a manner akin to Golosov and Sargent (2012).
When government bonds can be posted as collateral or otherwise facilitate private liquidity, they
effectively serve as a form of “money”. At an abstract level, our paper is thus closely connected to
the literature on the Friedman rule (e.g., Chari, Christiano and Kehoe, 1996, Correia and Teles,
1999). To make this relation most transparent, we design our Bewley-like variant in such a way that
the planner’s problem is formally equivalent to the one in a monetary economy in which real money
balances enter the household’s utility. This permits us to isolate the key modelling differences
that are responsible for the violation of the Friedman rule in our setting. As we explain in due
course, these differences concern the micro-foundations of the demand for liquidity; the details of
the available tax instruments; and, most crucially, the fact that all government liabilities provide
liquidity services in our model, while in the aforementioned literature only a subset do.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) study the impact of adverse
financial shocks in Bewley-like models, documenting how such shocks depress interest rates and
aggregate demand. Our analysis has similar positive properties, but it also establishes how optimal
debt management ought to respond to such shocks, and how this alleviates their macroeconomic
effects. Challe and Ragot (2011) also explore the liquidity role of public debt in a Bewley-type
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model, but do not characterize the optimal policy.
The analysis of optimal policy also differentiates ours from work that, motivated by the recent
crisis, studies the impact of a credit crunch on the allocation of capital across firms (e.g., Arellano,
Bai and Kehoe, 2012, Buera and Moll, 2012, Khan and Thomas, 2011). This literature often allows
for rich heterogeneity and rich firm-level dynamics in order to deliver more on the quantitative front.
By contrast, we simplify in these dimensions in order to build a bridge to the Ramsey paradigm
and shed new light on the policy questions of interest.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our baseline model,
in which the financial friction aﬄicts firms. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4
studies the Ramsey problem and characterizes optimal policy. Section 6 elaborates on the key
trade-off that shapes the optimal policy. Section 6 examines the optimal policy response to fiscal
and financial shocks. Section 7 extends the analysis to a model variant in which the financial friction
aﬄicts consumers and elaborates on the relation of our paper to the literature on the Friedman rule.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
The economy is populated by a large number of ex-ante identical households and there is a single
final good that can be used either for consumption or investment purposes. Time is indexed by
t ∈ N and households by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each household contains a consumer, a worker and a producer (or
entrepreneur). The consumer chooses how to allocate the household income between consumption,
investment in physical capital, and purchases of government bonds. The worker supplies labor in a
competitive labor market. The producer runs a firm, that produces the final good out of capital and
labor. We index firms by the identity of their owner and we use the term “agent i” interchangeably
for either household i or firm i.
To simplify the exposition, we abstract for the time being from aggregate uncertainty (we in-
troduce aggregate shocks in Section 6). We let firms be subject to idiosyncratic TFP shocks. In
particular, the technology that firm i has access to during period t is given by
yit = aitF (kit, nit),
where ait is the idiosyncratic TFP shock, kit is the capital input, nit is the labor input, and F is
a neoclassical production function, with F (k, n) = kαnθ, α, θ ∈ (0, 1), and α + θ < 1. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that the TFP shock is i.i.d. across both i and t and can take two values,
ait = a
L = 1 or ait = aH = A > 1, with respective probabilities (1− pi) and pi, where pi ∈ (0, 1).
Firms can adjust their inputs after observing their realized productivity. To attain first-best
efficiency, capital would thus have to constantly flow from the rest of the economy to the firms that
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happen to be have received the high-productivity shock at any given point. A financial friction,
however, inhibits the efficient allocation of capital.
In particular, we specify the market structure in the model as follows. Each period is split in
two stages. Employment and production take place in the “afternoon” (second stage), alongside
consumption and saving decisions. A capital market operates in the “morning” (first stage) in
order to facilitate the re-allocation of capital from low-productivity to high-productivity firms. In
this market, agents rent capital in exchange for private IOUs. Let pt denote the price that clears
this market and zit the position taken by agent i; that is, agent i borrows zit units of capital in
the morning and promises to pay ptzit units of the consumption good in the afternoon.6 Once
the afternoon arrives, however, a borrower can always renege and “run away”. If he does so, his
creditors cannot force repayment against his future labor income.7 They can nevertheless confiscate
a fraction ξ ∈ (0, 1] of any capital installed in his firm, as well as all of his bond holdings. It follows
that agent i faces the following borrowing, or collateral, constraint:
ptzit 6 ξkit + bit,
where kit is his capital stock and bit are his bond holdings (measured in terms of consumption-good
receipts during the afternoon).8
Let κit be the capital that agent i has invested in his firm by the end of period t− 1. Then, the
total amount of capital employed in his firm during period t and that can be confiscated in case of
default is given by kit = κit + zit. Using this fact and anticipating that in equilibrium pt > ξ this
constraint can be rewritten as follows:
kit 6
ptκit + bit
pt − ξ . (1)
This highlights how the financial friction may inhibit the efficient allocation of capital. In particular,
the left hand side of condition (1) gives an upper bound on the amount of capital that can be
installed in firm i. This amount is a multiple of the net worth, ptκit + bit, of the firm’s owner: for
any extra unit of net worth, the agent can leverage up and increase his capital input by `t units,
where `t = 1/(pt − ξ) represents the equilibrium leverage ratio. Naturally, this ratio increases with
ξ, the fraction of capital that can be posted as collateral. This permit us to interpret ξ as a proxy
of the severity of financial frictions: The smaller the value of ξ, the tighter the financial frictions.
6Agent i is a borrower if zit > 0 and a creditor if zit < 0.
7This is the assumption of the “inalienability of human capital” introduced by Hart and Moore (1994) and followed
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and much of the literature on financial frictions.
8The assumption that creditors can confiscate the entity, rather than a fraction, of an agent’s bond holdings is
inessential for the qualitative properties of our model. For instance, if we let creditors confiscate only a fraction ξ′ of
i’s bond holdings, then the borrowing constraint becomes ptzit 6 ξkit + ξ′bit. Nothing essential then changes in our
subsequent analysis, provided of course that ξ′ > 0, so that government bonds can still serve as collateral.
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These features of our model are similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and a vast macroeconomic
literature on financial frictions. But whereas much of this literature is concerned with the endo-
geneity and the cyclical properties of the leverage ratio, the key feature for our purposes is that the
cross-sectional of the right-hand-side term of (1) increases with the level of public debt. Our model
thereby captures the idea that issuance of more public debt can increase the “aggregate collateral”
in the economy and can thereby alleviate the financial friction.
As already mentioned, production takes place in stage 2, along with consumption and saving
decisions. At this point, the value of the firm run by agent i, defined as non-depreciated capital
plus sales minus labor and borrowing costs, is given by
piit = (1− δ)kit + yit − wtnit − ptzit,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the physical depreciation rate. The end-of-period budget constraint of the agent
can thus be written as
cit + xit + qtbit+1 = bit + piit + (1− τt)wthit,
where cit is consumption expenditure, κit+1 is savings in capital, bit+1 is purchases of government
bonds, qt is the price of these bonds, wt is the wage rate, and τt is the tax rate on labor income.
The government’s budget constraint is given by
qtBt+1 = Bt + gt − τtwtHt,
where Bt+1 is the level of debt issued in period t, qt is their price, gt is the (exogenous) level of
government spending, and Ht ≡
∫
i hit is total labor supply. The government bond market therefore
clears if and only if
∫
i bit = Bt. Similarly, the IOU/capital market clears if and only if
∫
i zit = 0,
and the labor market clears if and only if
∫
i nit =
∫
i hit.
We complete the description of the model by specifying household preferences as follows:
U = E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(cit, hit)
]
(2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and cit ∈ R is consumption, hit ∈ R+ is labor supply. The
per-period utility function is given by U(c, h) = c− v(h), with v(h) = 11+h1+ and  > 0.
Remarks. As we will see, the specification of shocks and preferences mimics the modeling
strategy of Lagos and Wright (2005) in that it guarantees that the equilibrium wealth distribution
is degenerate (all agents enter any period with the same level of wealth). If one were interested in
steady-state allocations for time-invariant policies, this modeling strategy would not be necessary.
For the purposes of our paper, however, it is essential to compute the equilibrium dynamics and the
associated welfare for arbitrary policy paths. Clearly, this would be a taunting task if one had to keep
the entire wealth distribution as a state variable, which explains the necessity of the aforementioned
modeling strategy. An additional benefit is that our preference specification is exactly the same as
the one in the baseline model of AMSS, thus providing a clean benchmark for reference.
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3 Equilibrium
We first solve the typical agent’s decision problem. We then proceed to show that the aggregate
equilibrium behavior of our economy can be represented as the equilibrium behavior of a fictitious
representative-agent model with aggregate TFP distortions. We finally summarize the set of equi-
librium conditions by a smaller, and more convenient, set of implementability constraints faced by
the Ramsey planner.
The agent’s decision problem. The assumption that preferences are linear in consumption and
that the productivity shock is i.i.d. guarantees that any heterogeneity in income is absorbed by
consumption and that all agents choose the same labor supply and the same savings at the end
of each period. We thus let hit = ht, bit = bt, and κit = κt for all i. Furthermore, borrowing and
production decisions differ across agents only in so far as they have different productivity levels.
We thus let zit = zst , kit = kst , nit = nst , yit = yst , and piit = pist , with s = L if ait = aL and
s = H if ait = aH . That is, we effectively have only two types of agents, those in state s = L
(low productivity, or low type) and those in state s = H (high productivity, or high type). Agents
transit across these two types in an i.i.d. fashion.
Let ωst ≡ pist − ptκt = yst −wtnit− ptkit, for s ∈ {L,H}. Building on the preceding observations,
the household’s problem can be reduced to the following:
max E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt [cst − v(ht)]
}
(3)
subject to
cst + κt+1 + qtbt+1 = ptκt + bt + ω
s
t + (1− τt)wtht ∀s ∈ {L,H} (4)
ωst = a
sF (kst , n
s
t ) + (1− δ)kst − wtnst − ptkst ∀s ∈ {L,H} (5)
kst 6
ptκt + bt
pt − ξ ∀s ∈ {L,H} (6)
Let µst be the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint in state s, for s ∈ {L,H}. It
is easy to verify that, in any equilibrium in which the quantities of capital and public debt are
positive (κt, Bt > 0), the borrowing constraint can bind at most for the high type.9 Furthermore,
note that output and employment would have been zero if capital were zero, which implies that the
9To see this, note that, for any given wages, the high type demands more capital than the low type, simply because
his productivity is higher. Therefore, if the borrowing constraint binds for the low type, it must also bind for the
high type. But if the constraint binds for both types, then it must be that kst = ptκt+btpt−ξ for both s and hence
(1− pi)kLt + pikHt = ptκt + bt
pt − ξ .
At the same time, market clearing in the capital and bond markets requires (1 − pi)kLt + pikHt = κt and bt = Bt.
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restriction κt > 0 is without any loss of generality. Finally, the restriction Bt > 0 is also without
loss of generality at least in the neighborhood of the Ramsey steady state, where we will find that
public debt is strictly positive. With these observations in mind, we take henceforth for granted
that κt > 0 and Bt > 0. It follows that we can drop the borrowing constraint for the low type (or,
equivalently, anticipate that µLt = 0).
Note that the (kst , nst ) matter for the agent’s optimization problem only through constraints
(5) and (6). It follows that the optimal input choices of the low and the high type maximize,
respectively, ωLt and ωHt − µHt kHt . Their demands for labor and capital are therefore pinned down
by the following:
Fn(k
L
t , n
L
t ) = wt AFn(k
H
t , n
H
t ) = wt
1− δ + Fk(kLt , nLt ) = pt 1− δ +AFk(kHt , nHt ) = pt + µHt
That is, both types equate their MPL with the wage rate, but only the high type equates his MPK
with the rental rate of capital. The low type, instead, faces a wedge between his MPL and the
rental rate of capital due to the financial friction.10
Now let νt be the Lagrange multiplier on budget constraint (4). The agent’s first-order condition
for labor supply is then given by
v′(ht) = νt(1− τt)wt;
the one for bonds is given by
qtνt = βνt+1
{
1 + pi
1
pt+1 − ξµ
H
t+1
}
.
and the one for capital by
νt = pt+1βνt+1
{
1 + pi
1
pt+1 − ξµ
H
t+1
}
Finally, the first-order condition for consumption together with the assumption that U is linear in
c imply that νt = 1.
In order to interpret the conditions for bonds and capital, note first that, in the absence of
financial frictions (µt+1 = 0), they reduce to qt = 1/pt+1 = β, meaning that the returns to bonds
and capital are equated with each other and they are both equal to the inter-temporal MRS in
consumption (which is here fixed at β because of the linearity of U in c). In the presence of
financial frictions, the two rates of return are still equated with one another, because both bonds
and capital can serve equally well as collateral. Nevertheless, as long as the borrowing constraint
Combining these conditions gives
κt =
ptκt +Bt
pt − ξ ,
which cannot possibly hold as long as κt, Bt > 0.
10If the high-type had to borrow in order not only to rent extra capital but also to employ labor, then the wedge
would show up in his demand for labor as well. This, however, would not affect the essence of our results.
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binds in the low state, the associated Lagrange multiplier introduces a wedge between these two
rates of return and the inter-temporal MRS. In this sense, we have that both capital and government
bonds are priced at a premium relative to any other asset that is an equally good form of saving
but cannot serve as collateral, as well as at a premium relative to their prices in the frictionless
benchmark. The equilibrium value of this premium in period t is given by pi 1pt+1−ξµ
H
t+1. It is thus
increasing in the probability that the constraint binds, (pi), in the wedge between the marginal
product of capital of the high and the low type, (µHt+1), and in the leverage ratio (
1
pt+1−ξ ).
The aggregate TFP distortion. Let Yt and Ct denote aggregate output and consumption:
Yt ≡ piyHt + (1− pi)yLt , Ct ≡ picHt + (1− pi)cLt .
We can show that aggregate output can be expressed as follows:
Yt = Γ(xt)κ
α
t h
θ
t
where xt ≡ kHt /κt is the fraction of aggregate capital allocated to the high type and
Γ(x) ≡
{
piA
1
1−θ (x)
α
1−θ + (1− pi)
(
1− pix
1− pi
) α
1−θ
}1−θ
. (7)
The quantity Γt = Γ(xt) therefore identifies aggregate TFP as a function of the allocation of capital
between the low and the high type.
Clearly, if there were no financial friction, the equilibrium would feature xt = x? ≡ arg maxx Γ(x),
that is, the allocation of capital would maximize aggregate TFP. The same remains true in our model
as long as the borrowing constraint does not bind. But when this constraints binds, xt < x? and
aggregate TFP is less than maximal.
The magnitude of the TFP distortion is manifested in the shadow cost of the collateral constraint
and thereby in the liquidity premium. Indeed, it can be shown that the Lagrange multiplier, µHt ,
which measures the shadow cost of the collateral constraint, satisfies
piµHt = Γ
′(xt)κα−1t h
θ
t .
From the household’s Euler conditions for capital and the bond we have that pt = 1/qt−1 and
qt−1 = β
{
1 + 1pt−ξpiµ
H
t
}
. Combining these results we obtain the following relation between the
price of public debt and the TFP distortion:
qt−1 = β
{
1 +
qt−1
(1− ξqt−1)Γ
′(xt)κα−1t h
θ
t
}
.
It is evident that qt−1 > β if and only if Γ′(xt) > 0, or equivalently xt < x?. Furthermore, qt−1
increases with the magnitude of Γ′(xt) for any given κt and ht. The Ramsey planner can therefore
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alleviate the TFP distortion by inducing a higher bond price—or, conversely, the planner can enjoy
a lower cost of servicing the public debt by accommodating a higher TFP distortion. This trade off
between TFP distortions and interest rates appears to be endemic to many other models in which
credit frictions affect the allocation of capital and the incentives to save,11 and is central to the
nature of the policy results we obtain in the next section.
The following result, which expresses the equilibrium capital allocation and the associated TFP
level as functions of the bond price, summarizes the observations made above.
Lemma 1. There exist decreasing functions X : [β, ξ−1) → R+ and Ψ : [β, ξ−1) → R+ such that
the equilibrium value of the ratio xt ≡ kHt /κt and of aggregate TFP are given by
xt = X(qt−1) and Γt = Ψ(qt−1).
These functions satisfy X(β) = x? ≡ arg maxx Γ(x) > 1 and Ψ(β) = Γ? ≡ maxx Γ(x), and are given
by
X(q) ≡ Φ(q)
1− pi + piΦ(q) , with Φ(q) ≡
(
βpiA
1
1−θ (1− (1− δ)q)
βpi(1− (1− δ)q) + (q − β)(1− ξq)
) 1−θ
1−α−θ
and Ψ(q) ≡ Γ (X(q)) , with Γ(x) defined as in (7).
The implementability constraints. Using the preceding results, we can state the following
proposition that summarizes the key implementability constraints faced by the Ramsey planner.
Proposition 1. Let s˜ = (s˜1, s˜2), with s˜1 ≡ {Yt, Ct, ht, κt, bt, qt−1}∞t=0 and s˜2 ≡ {pt, wt, τt, cHt , cLt , yHt ,
yLt , k
H
t , k
L
t , n
H
t , n
L
t }∞t=0. The sequence s˜ can be implemented as an equilibrium if and only if
(i) given s˜1, s˜2 satisfies the preceding characterization results; and
(ii) s˜1 satisfies the following system:
Ct + gt + κt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)κt (8)
Yt = Ψ(qt−1)καt h
θ
t (9)
qtbt+1 = bt + gt − θYt + v′(ht)ht (10)
qt−1 = β
{
1 +
qt−1
(1− ξqt−1)Γ
′(xt)κα−1t h
θ
t
}
(11)
(1− ξqt−1)X(qt−1)κt 6 κt + qt−1bt and qt−1 > β wcs. (12)
The interpretation of the above conditions is straightforward: (8) is the resource constraint; (9)
is the effective aggregate production function, with the equilibrium TFP distortion captured by the
term Ψ(qt−1); (10) is the budget constraint of the government, with the equilibrium condition for
labor already included; (11) is the Euler condition that pins down the equilibrium price of public
debt; and finally (12) is the equilibrium collateral constraint.
11For example, it is also present in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Buera and Nicolini (2012).
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Before proceeding to solve the Ramsey problem, let us note that a higher κt has two opposing
effects on the collateral constraint. On the one hand, for any given xt = X(qt−1), a higher κt means
a higher investment in the high-productivity technology, which tightens the constraint. On the other
hand, a higher κt also increases the available collateral, which loosens the constraint. Which effect
dominates depends on the capital allocation xt ≡ k
H
t
κt
and the leverage ratio `t ≡ 1pt−ξ =
qt−1
1−ξqt−1 .
We henceforth impose ξ < ξ¯ ≡ x?−ββx? , which is necessary and sufficient for the first-best allocation
to violate the collateral constraint whenever bt = 0. Under this parameter restriction, if the planner
wishes to induce the first-best use of capital, he can do so only by issuing a sufficiently positive level
of debt. Furthermore, the aforementioned tightening effect of a higher κt dominates at least as long
as xt and qt−1 are near their first-best levels.
4 Ramsey optimum
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal policy and the optimal allocation can be identified by selecting
the sequence {Yt, Ct, ht, κt, bt, qt−1}∞t=0 that maximizes ex-ante welfare subject to the constraints (8)-
(12). Before solving this problem, we first consider the benchmark without financial frictions. This
is not only a useful benchmark for comparison purposes, but also a useful building step towards the
Ramsey problem with frictions.
The Ramsey problem without frictions. Suppose there is no financial friction. In this case,
the Ramsey optimum satisfies xt = x?, Γt = Γ?, and qt = β for all t. Furthermore, using the fact
that Ct = Yt + (1− δ)κt − κt+1 − gt, we can express the present value of consumption as
∞∑
t=0
βtCt = Y0 + (1− δ)κ0 − g0 +
∞∑
t=1
βt
{
Yt + (1− δ)κt − 1
β
κt − gt
}
,
where Yt = Γ?καt hθt . It follows that the optimal κt is given by
κt = κ˜t ≡ max
κ
{
Γ?καhθt + (1− δ)κ−
1
β
κ
}
= χh
θ
1−α
t ,
where χ ≡
(
αβΓ?
1−β(1−δ)
) 1
1−α
. That is, we can think of κt as an intermediate input, whose price
is pinned down by β, and whose optimal use increases with employment. Let us now define the
following transformations of the output and consumption series:
y˜t ≡ Yt + (1− δ)κ˜t − 1
β
κ˜t and c˜t ≡ Ct + κ˜t+1 − 1
β
κ˜t,
with κ˜t being the aforementioned optimal capital choice. To simplify the exposition, we assume
that the initial κ0 happens to be the optimal one (κ0 = κ˜0).12 Letting ∆ ≡ (1 − α)1−β(1−δ)αβ χ > 0,
12If we let κ0 6= κ˜0, nothing essential changes in the result we present below. The only difference is that the very
first period of the Ramsey problem becomes special: optimal employment and taxes are the same from t = 1 and
onwards, but they are different at t = 0 because the productivity of labor is different.
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η ≡ θ1−α ∈ (0, 1), and f(h) ≡ ∆hζ , we then reach the following reduced-form representation of the
Ramsey problem.
Lemma 2. Let the financial friction be removed. The allocation {Yt, Ct, ht} is optimal if and only
if the associated sequence {y˜t, c˜t, ht} solves the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt {c˜t − v(ht)}
s.t. c˜t + gt = f(ht) ∀t > 0
b0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ηc˜t − v′(ht)ht − (1− η)gt
}
This problem is essentially the same as the standard Ramsey problem under the restriction of
linear utility, as in AMSS. The first constraint is the resource constraint and the second constant is
the familiar implementability constraint.13
To obtain the solution to this problem, let λ be the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability
constraint (the shadow value of tax revenue) and θt the Lagrange multiplier on the period-t resource
constraint (the shadow value of resources). The first-order conditions give
θt = 1 + ηλ
and
θtf
′(ht) = v′(ht) + λ
[
v′(ht) + v′′(ht)ht
]
It follows that ht = h? for all t, where h? is the unique solution to
(1 + ηλ)f ′(h) = (1 + λ+ λ)v′(h)
and  ≡ v′′(h)h/v′(h) is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. We thus arrive at the following result.
Proposition 2. In the absence of frictions, the Ramsey optimum features identical taxes and iden-
tical employment, investment, and output levels across all periods:
τt = τ0, ht = h0, κt = κ0, yt = y0, ∀t > 0.
The frictionless variant of our model features a perfect form of tax smoothing, as in the de-
terministic backbones of Barro (1979) and AMSS. The rate of taxation and the level of debt stay
constant over time, and so do aggregate employment and output. By the same token, the model
does not feature a determinate steady state: the long-run values of all policy instruments and all
allocations move one-to-one with the initial level of debt. When there is aggregate uncertainty but
the government can issue (or replicate) a complete set of state-contingent debt instruments, the
analogue to this property is the presence of a unit-root component, as established in AMSS. As we
will see shortly, these properties cease to hold once we give public debt a liquidity role.
13The only formal difference is the presence of the scalars η and (1− η) in front of, respectively, c˜t and gt.
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The Ramsey problem with frictions We now return to the case of interest, the Ramsey prob-
lem in the presence of financial frictions. The characterization of this problem is somewhat complex,
because the dynamics of the economy alternate between two regimes, depending on whether the
collateral constraint binds or not, and also because the dynamics are highly non-linear whenever
the constraint binds. In what follows we only sketch the procedure we follow in order to implement
a low-dimensional numerical solution.
Let zt be the period-t level of debt minus the contemporaneous tax revenue:
zt ≡ bt − τtwtht.
We can think of zt as a monotone transformation of bt, and in this sense, as a relevant state variable.
We can then show the following.
Lemma 3. There exists a function Z such that the collateral constraint binds in period t if and
only if zt < Z(τt).
To prove this result, assume that the constraint does not bind. In this case, xt = x?, Γt = Γ?,
qt = β, and κt = κ˜t ≡ χh
θ
1−α
t , implying that the collateral constraint reduces to
βbt > [(1− ξβ)x? − 1]χh
θ
1−α
t .
It follows that the collateral constraint does not bind only if
bt > B(ht),
where B(h) ≡ ((1−ξβ)x?−1)χβ h
θ
1−α . Next, noting that the wage rate satisfies wt = f ′(ht) and the
labor supply v′(ht) = (1 − τt)wt, we infer that, as long as the collateral constraint does not bind,
employment and tax revenue are given by
ht = H
?(τt) ≡ Φh(1− τt)
1−α
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
τtwtht = T
?(τt) ≡ Φττt(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ .
for some constants Φh,Φt > 0. Using these facts together with the definition of zt, we conclude that
bt > B(ht) (and the constraint ceases to bind) if and only if
zt > Z(τt),
where Z(τ) ≡ B (H(τ)) − T (τ) = (Φb − Φττ)(1 − τ)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ , for some constant Φb. Note also
that Z(τ) is a decreasing function of τ. This is because a higher rate of taxation discourages labor
supply, which in turn depresses the marginal product of capital and reduces the minimal level of
debt that is consistent with a non-binding collateral constraint.
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Consider now the case in which zt < Z(τt), or equivalently bt < B(ht). In this case, labor supply
is still pinned down by v′(ht) = (1− τt)wt, but now the wage rate is a function of qt−1, because the
latter determines the TFP distortion in the economy. Accordingly, the equilibrium allocations and
the resulting tax revenue and utility flows can be expressed as functions of τt and qt−1.
Lemma 4. There exist continuous functions H,K, Y, T, and U such that
ht = H(τt, qt−1), κt = K(τt, qt−1), Yt = Y (τt, qt−1), (13)
τtwtht = T (τt, qt−1), Ct − v(ht) = U(τt, qt−1). (14)
The functions H,T, Y, and K are spelled out in the appendix. Not surprisingly, their values
at q = β coincide with those in the unconstrained regime, since q = β if and only if the collateral
constraint does not bind. The above lemma therefore applies irrespectively of whether the constraint
binds or not; the only difference is that qt−1 = β if zt > Z(τt), whereas qt−1 > β if zt < Z(τt).
Given these results and the definition of zt, we can express the collateral constraint as
qt−1 (zt + T (τt)) = [(1− ξqt−1)X(qt−1)− 1]K(τt, qt−1),
which in turn can be solved for qt−1 as a function of zt and τt. We can thus find a (continuous)
function Q such that, irrespectively of whether the collateral constraint binds or not, the price of
government debt can be expressed as
qt−1 = Q(zt, τt). (15)
The function Q captures the liquidity premium on public debt as a function of the levels of debt
and the tax distortion. It is described in the appendix and is such that it satisfies Q(z, τ) = β if
z > Z(τ) and Q(z, τ) > β otherwise.
Using the above results, we can express the expected period-t utility as
W (τt, zt) ≡ U(τt, Q(zt, τt)).
Next, letting B(z, τ) ≡ z + T (τ,Q(z, τ)), we can write the level of debt as a monotone function of
zt and τt:
bt+1 = B(zt, τt) (16)
We can also represent the implementability constraint as a constraint on (zt−1, zt, τt):
Q(zt, τt)B(zt, τt) = zt−1 + gt−1.
This means that zt serves as the key endogenous state of the Ramsey problem, while τt is the key
control variable.
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Proposition 3. The sequence {Yt, Ct, ht, κt, bt, qt−1}∞t=0 is optimal if and only if the following prop-
erties hold.
(i) The sequence {τt, zt}∞t=0 solves the following reduced-form Ramsey problem:
max
{τt,zt}
∞∑
t=0
βtW (τt, zt) (17)
s.t. Q(zt, τt)B(zt, τt) = zt−1 + gt−1. (18)
(ii) With the sequence {τt, zt}∞t=0 determined as above, the sequence {Yt, Ct, ht, κt, bt, qt−1}∞t=0
satisfies conditions (13)-(16).
This result provides us with a low-dimension dynamic program that can be solved to obtain the
optimal policy and the optimal allocation. The details of the numerical algorithm are explained in
the appendix.
Parametrization. Our model is too stylized to permit a serious quantitative exploration.14 We
thus use a plausible parametrization of the model, as reported in Table 1, only to illustrate the
shape of the optimal policy and its sensitivity to the underlying primitives.
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
capital elasticity α 0.30 labor elasticity θ 0.60
discount factor β 0.96 inverse labor supply elasticity ε 1.00
labor disutility ϑ 1.00 depreciation rate δ 0.06
high TFP probability pi 0.50 high-to-low TFP ratio A 2.25
share of confiscated capital ξ 0.38 government share g/y 0.22
The discount rate is set to 4% per year. The labor elasticity is set to 0.6 and the capital share
to 0.3, so that the overall returns to scale are 0.9. The labor disutility is assumed to be quadratic,
meaning that the Frisch elasticity is 1. The depreciation rate is set to 6% per year. The high TFP
level is set to 2.25, with a probability of occurrence of 0.5. The government share is set to 22%. The
severity of the financial friction, which is captured by the fraction of capital, ξ, that is confiscated
in the event of default is calibrated so that the steady-state interest rate is 2% (equivalently, the
liquidity premium is also 2%); this implies ξ = 0.38. While the numerical results reported below
are specific to this parametrization, the qualitative patterns that emerge are quite general.
14Such an exploration would have to allow, at the very least, for realistic firm-level heterogeneity and firm-level
dynamics, which would undermine the tractability of our framework and give rise to severe computational challenges.
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Figure 1: The Optimal Policy Rules and the Price of Debt
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Note: The vertical dashed line indicates the level of debt above which the borrowing constraint ceases to
bind and the liquidity premium vanishes (the “satiation point”). The dot indicates the steady state.
The optimal policy. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal policy. The top-left and top-right panels
depict, respectively, the optimal gross debt issuance (bt+1) and the optimal deficit (∆bt+1 ≡ bt+1−bt)
as a function of the inherited level of debt (bt). The bottom-left panel gives the optimal level of
taxation (τt). Finally, the bottom right panel gives the equilibrium price of debt (qt+1).15
Four properties are worth highlighting.
First, there exists a unique steady state. The steady state is identified by the intersection of
the policy rule for debt with the 45-degree line and is indicated with a bullet in the figure. In our
numerical example, the steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio is about 72%.
Second, the steady-state level of debt is below the threshold level at which the borrowing con-
straint ceases to bind. This threshold level is indicated with the dashed vertical line in the figure
and can also be interpreted as the point at which the economy’s demand for liquidity is satiated
(the liquidity premium is zero). In this sense, the analogue of the Friedman rule does not hold.
Third, the policy rules are continuous and monotonic on the left of the aforementioned thresh-
15We solve the model in terms of zt for computational reasons, but report the policy rules in terms of bt to facilitate
the interpretation. Also, we normalize the scale of bt by the steady state level of GDP.
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old, but exhibit multiple discontinuities, and patterns that resemble “wiggles” on the right of this
threshold. These wiggles are the manifestation of the non-convexity of the planner’s problem, which
in turn emerges because, and only because, the price of debt is a function of the level of debt.16
Fourth, the steady state is globally stable: no matter the initial level of debt, the economy
eventually gets closer and closer to it. By the same token, perfect tax smoothing is not optimal.
Instead, there is a positive drift in the optimal levels of taxation and debt when the economy starts
below the steady state, and a negative drift when it starts above.
These results reflect the trade off between the two key distortions confronted by the planner.
By lowering the level of public debt, the planner tightens the agents’ borrowing constraint, which
exacerbates the inefficiency in the allocation of capital and reduces output. But this tightening also
increases the agents’ willingness to hold public debt as collateral, which in turn reduces the interest
rate the government has to pay on its debt, mitigating the tax distortion. The steady-state debt
level is determined by the balancing of these two effects. When the initial level of debt is below the
steady state, the benefit of improving efficiency in production outweighs the cost of raising interest
rates and suffering higher taxes, so the planner finds it optimal to issue more debt. The converse is
true when the initial level of debt is above the steady state.
These properties are further illustrated in Figure 2, which depicts the transitional dynamics
when the economy starts with an initial level of debt that is either below the steady state (solid red
lines) or above it (dashed blue lines).17
In the first scenario, the initial level of debt is sufficiently below the the steady state, and hence
the bite of the financial friction is sufficiently severe, that the interest rate is negative.18 The planner
then finds it optimal to accumulate more debt, not only because it wishes to alleviate the financial
friction, but also because it can effectively reduce the present value of taxes by raising a bit more
debt. As more and more debt is issued, however, the friction gets relaxed, the interest rate turns
positive, and issuing debt becomes costly. Debt nevertheless continues to increases monotonically
towards the steady state, as the benefit of facilitating a more efficient allocation of capital outweighs
any other consideration. Along this transition, taxes also increase monotonically. Finally, output
increases despite the increase in taxes, thanks to the more efficient allocation of capital.
In the second scenario, the initial level of debt is sufficiently that the economy actually starts
16When we mechanically shut down this effect (which we do below in order to build intuition), the value function
of the planner is strictly concave and the policy rules are continuous and monotone.
17We choose the initial level of debt to be 12.5% below/above the steady state. Within our numerical example,
this choice helps us best illustrate the properties we discuss below.
18This can be seen in the bottom-left panel of Figure 2: in the early phase of the transition (solid red line), the
liquidity premium exceeds 4%, which is the discount rate, and hence the interest rate is negative. Also note that
this possibility illustrates the mechanism that is at the core of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Guirrieri and
Lorenzoni (2012), namely that the natural rate of interest can turn negative when financial constraints are sufficiently
tight. We revisit this point in Section 6, when we study the optimal policy response to financial shocks.
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Figure 2: Transitional Dynamics
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Note: This figure illustrates the optimal transition to the steady state when the economy starts either
below the steady state ( ) or above it ( ).
above the the satiation threshold: the borrowing constraint is not binding and the liquidity premium
is zero. As long as the economy is above this point, the tax rate is kept constant, as in Barro (1979),
but at a level that is higher than the level required to keep the level of debt constant. The planner
thus runs surpluses, gradually withdrawing debt and eventually crossing the satiation threshold. At
that point, the borrowing constraint begins to bind, the liquidity premium becomes positive and
the planner starts enjoying the benefit of a lower interest rate. Public debt is further reduced until
this benefit is balanced by the production inefficiency created by the tighter borrowing constraints.
5 Anatomy of the Optimal Policy
In this section we elaborate on the key trade-off behind our results. We next illustrate how this trade-
off shapes the comparative statics of the steady state. We finally clarify the role that interest-rate
variation plays in the Ramsey problem once interest rates manifest the bite of financial frictions.
The key trade-off and tax smoothing. To reveal how the trade-off between liquidity provision
and interest-rate manipulation shapes the optimal policy, we consider two variants of the Ramsey
problem. In the first variant, we mechanically block the effect of public debt on production and
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Figure 3: Isolating the liquidity-provision and the interest-rate-manipulation effects.
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welfare. Formally, we maintain the budget constraint unchanged as in (1), but replace the welfare
objective W (τt, zt) in (17) with Wˆ (τt) ≡ W (τt, zˆ), where zˆ is exogenously fixed. In the second
variant, we mechanically shut down the interest-rate manipulation. Formally, we now leave the
welfare objective unchanged as in (17), but replace the price of debt qt = Q(τt, zt) in the budget
constraint (1) with qˆt = β. By solving these two variant Ramsey problems, we can thus isolate the
policy implications of each of the two sides of the aforementioned trade-off.
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 3. When we block the impact of debt on welfare
(dotted red line in the figure), the policy rule for debt-issuance shifts down: the planner chooses to
run smaller deficits and issue less debt than in our model in order to decrease the interest-rate costs
and tax distortion. When we take away, instead, his ability to manipulate interest rates (dashed
blue line), the policy rule shifts up: the planner opts to run bigger deficits and issue more debt,
relative to our model, in order to further alleviate the impact of the financial friction on production
and welfare. What is more, in the long run the planner actually finds it optimal to satiate the
economy’s demand for public debt: the steady state of this variant obtains exactly at the point
where the borrowing constraint ceases to bind.19
To develop more intuition, it is useful to think about these observations in the context of the
familiar analogy between tax smoothing and consumption smoothing. It is well known from Barro
19Note that the satiation point is not the same across the three Ramsey problems under consideration because (i) the
planner chooses different taxes in each problem and (ii) the rate of taxation affects labor supply, which in equilibrium
affects the internal return to capital and thereby the threshold level of debt needed for the borrowing constraint not
to bind. If modify the model so that labor is used in a different sector than capital (say, the “entrepreneurial sector”
employs only capital, and the “agricultural sector” employs only labor), the aforementioned interaction between the
rate of taxation and the bite of the financial friction disappears, and the satiation level of debt becomes the same
across the three Ramsey problems.
20
(1979) and AMSS that the standard Ramsey policy problem is formally similar to a consumption-
saving problem; one only has to reinterpret the relevant control and state variables, from consump-
tion and wealth in the consumer problem to taxes (or surpluses) and debt in the Ramsey problem.
Our model deviates from the standard Ramsey problem by effectively making the level of debt enter
both the planner’s welfare objective and the interest rate in the planner’s budget constraint.
With this in mind, consider a modification of the canonical consumer problem that allows the
consumer’s wealth to enter his preferences, as well as to affect the interest rate he faces:
max
{ct,wt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt [U(ct) + V (wt)]
s.t. wt+1 = R(wt+1)(wt + yt − ct)
where c is consumption, w is wealth, y is (exogenous) income, U measures the utility from con-
sumption (with U ′ > 0 > U ′′), V measures the utility from wealth (with V ′ ≥ 0 ≥ V ′′), and R gives
the interest rate as a function of wealth.
In the standard case, where V (w) = 0 and R(w) = β−1 for all w, the consumer’s Euler con-
dition gives U ′(ct) = U ′(ct+1) and therefore ct = ct+1, irrespectively of the time path of income.
This explains the optimality of consumption smoothing in the textbook treatment of the consumer
problem—and, by analogy, the optimality of tax smoothing in Barro (1979) and AMSS. But now
suppose that there exists some w¯ such that V ′(w) > 0 if w < w¯ and V ′(w) = 0 otherwise, meaning
that w¯ identifies the satiation point of wealth. If we maintain the assumption R = β−1, the Euler
condition gives U ′(ct) = U ′(ct+1) + V ′(wt+1) and therefore ct < ct+1 as long as wt+1 < w¯. For
levels of wealth below the satiation point, the consumer thus give up consumption smoothing for
the sake of getting closer to that satiation point. By analogy, in the variant of the Ramsey prob-
lem considered above where we maintained the effect of debt on welfare but exogenously imposed
qt = β, the planner found it optimal to give up tax smoothing and accumulate more debt, up to
the point that the economy’s demand for liquidity was satiated. Finally, consider the more general
case where wealth also affects the interest rate. In this case, the consumer may find it optimal to
keep his wealth below w¯ in the long run in order to manipulate the interest rate he faces—just like
the planner in our model finds it optimal not to satiate the economy’s demand for liquidity in the
long run in order to manipulate the interest-rate cost of servicing the public debt.
These observations help also clarify the driving forces behind the violation of the Friedman
rule in the short (transitional dynamics) vs the long run (steady state). Both our model and the
variant considered above (where debt enters welfare but the interest is fixed) imply a violation of the
Friedman rule in the short run, in the sense that the optimal level of public debt in any given period
falls short of the satiation level when the initial level of debt is not too high. However, this variant
implies that the planner will find it optimal to satisfy the Friedman rule in the long run, which is
not the case in our model. Since this variant shuts down the planner’s ability to manipulate interest
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rates but otherwise maintains the distortionary effects of taxation, this proves that the violation of
the Friedman rule in the long run of our model hinges on the interest-rate manipulation channel,
not merely on distortionary taxation. By contrast, in the short run the Friedman rule could be
violated even if this manipulation channel were dormant.
At this point, it also worth clarifying the role of precluding the government from making
non-negative transfers to the agents. In a recent paper, Golosov and Sargent (2012) study a
heterogeneous-agent variant of AMSS that allows for richer tax schemes than our framework, and
prove a certain debt-irrelevance result: allocations that are implemented by a particular debt policy
can often be replicated with a particular sequence of non-negative lump-sum transfers and no pub-
lic debt.20 Seen through these lens, our analysis pins down a unique path for public debt only by
ruling out the possibility of replicating the liquidity services of public debt with lump-sum transfers.
The same qualification applies to, inter alia, Woodford (1990), Aiyagari and McGrattan (1997) and
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). That been said, the key trade-off between liquidity provision and
interest-rate manipulation that we have documented above remains present irrespectively of whether
liquidity is provided by debt or transfers. In this sense, our analysis could be recast as a theory of
optimal liquidity provision, without necessarily taking a stand on whether the optimal allocation
is ultimately implemented with debt or transfers. At the same time, we do favor the debt-based
interpretation on grounds of empirical plausibility and potential robustness to extensions of the
theory that restrict the ability, or desirability, of replicating debt with transfers.21
The optimal long-run quantity of public debt. To illustrate how the trade-off between liq-
uidity provision and interest-rate manipulation shapes the optimal long-run level of public debt, we
now explore how the steady state varies with the underlying primitives of the economy.
Figure 4 considers the comparative statics of the steady-state level of public debt with respect
to the severity of the financial friction, as parameterized by ξ. An increase in ξ, which means that
a larger fraction of capital can be seized by creditors in the event of default, relaxes the bite of the
borrowing constraint, facilitating a more efficient allocation of capital and leading to an increase in
output. By the same token, public debt becomes less valuable as collateral, which in turn explains
why the increase in ξ causes a reduction in the optimal quantity of debt.
To understand why the effects of ξ on the liquidity premium and on the price of debt can be non-
monotone, note that there are two opposing forces at work. As ξ becomes larger, capital becomes
20A similar point is made in Werning (2007) for the complete-markets case.
21For example, suppose that firms (or banks) have private information about their liquidity needs. Letting them
trade public debt may be a more practical, or more robust, way of implementing an efficient allocation of liquidity than,
say, a direct mechanism that tries to solicit this information and then send transfers to these agents. Alternatively,
suppose that politicians are not entirely benevolent and different groups can lobby for group-specific transfers. Then
substituting debt for transfers can help mitigate both the financial and the political-economy frictions. We leave a
formal exploration of these ideas for future work.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics: ξ
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more valuable as collateral, so the demand for capital increases, pushing up the liquidity value and
price of debt. But an increased supply of capital means more capital owned by the high types,
which dampens their borrowing needs (and hence their demand for debt). At sufficiently high levels
of ξ, the latter effect appears to dominate and liquidity (i.e., public debt) is priced at a lower rate
in spite of its reduced supply.
The effects of a change in the share of high types in the population, pi, are quite similar to those
described above for changes in ξ. An increase in pi means a larger share of high types. Having more
of them implies that a larger share of the capital stock is owned by the borrowers and thus more
collateral and a looser financial constraint (much like a higher ξ). At the same time, more high
types means higher borrowing needs and thus a tighter constraint.
In Figure 5 we turn attention to the comparative statics of the steady state with respect to the
level of government spending, which can be thought more broadly of as a parameter that controls the
shadow cost of the government budget and thereby the benefit of manipulating interest rates. Other
things equal, an increase in G/Y raises the tax rate that is needed to balance the budget in steady
state and makes the tax distortion more costly at the margin. To alleviate this additional cost,
public debt declines, causing a liquidity squeeze in the economy. This squeeze depresses economic
activity, but it also raises the liquidity premium on public debt, which in turn reduces interest-rate
costs and alleviates the aforementioned additional tax distortion.
Finally, it is worth contrasting our characterization of the optimal long-run level of public debt to
those in Woodford (1990) and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). These papers do not characterize the
optimal Ramsey plan. Instead, they study the steady state of their economies for an exogenously
fixed level of debt, and then identify the level of debt that maximizes the steady-state level of
welfare. In other words, they study the simple “golden rule”, which ignores the welfare effects of the
transitional dynamics. By contrast, we study the “modified golden rule”, which takes into account
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Figure 5: Comparative statics: G/Y
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
G/Y
Public Debt
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
G/Y
Liquidity Premium
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
G/Y
Output
the entire transitional dynamics. Depending on the parametrization, the quantitative implications
of this distinction can be either large or small.22 In any event, the marginal contribution of our
paper vis-a-vis these papers rests primarily in documenting the sub optimality of tax smoothing,
which we did above, and exploring the optimal dynamic response to shocks, which we do next.
Interest rates versus wedges. We conclude this section by clarifying the distinct role that the
equilibrium variation in interest rates starts playing in the Ramsey problem once there are financial
frictions. To this goal, it helps to draw again on the analogy to the standard consumer problem. In
that context, it is trivial to check that consumption smoothing remains optimal if the consumer’s
subjective discount rates varies over time and the interest rate happens to covary perfectly with it.
In a similar manner, the optimality of tax smoothing that we documented in Proposition 2 remains
intact if we let the discount factor of the private agents to very over time; the interest rate faced
by the planner now varies over time, but it continues to equal his discount factor. Importantly, this
not a mere coincidence; it is a necessary implication of the general equilibrium. What drives our
results is therefore, not the overall variation in interest rates, but rather the extent to which this
variation reflects variation in the bite of the financial friction, as captured by the wedge µt.
Apart from clarifying the mechanics of our theory, the above observation also has practical
consequences. In the ongoing policy debate about US fiscal policy, it is often argued that running
deficits and issuing more debt is desirable, not only because of Keynensian considerations, but also
22In our baseline parametrization, where the steady-state value of the liquidity premium is 1%, the steady-state
optimal debt output ratio is 0.84. The golden-rule steady state debt output ratio amounts to 0.77. Although the
difference between the two ratios is rather small in this benchmark parametrization, it may be much greater under
alternative parameterizations that raise the liquidity demand for public debt. For instance if ξ is 0.2, which means a
liquidity premium equal to 1.71%, the golden rule debt/output ratio is 1.68, while the optimal Ramsey policy gives
a steady-state debt/output ratio of 1.75. Likewise, if the share of government expenditures in GDP rises to 25%, the
golden-rule ratio is 0.66, while the Ramsey optimum is 0.71.
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because the interest rate on public debt is at a historically low level and hence it is “cheap” for the
government to borrow. Unfortunately, this argument appears to make no sense within the standard
Ramsey paradigm. In this framework, the equilibrium interest rate is perfectly tied to the discount
rate that the planner uses to discount future welfare and thereby future tax distortions, which in
turn means that observing a low interest rate in the present does not justify transferring the tax
burden to the future. In effect, public debt can be “cheap” in terms of the current budget only if tax
distortions are “expensive” in terms of future welfare, which invalidates the popular argument. It is
thus possible that the popular argument is merely a fallacy. The resolution, however, we propose is
that the popular argument makes sense if the observed variation in interest rates reflects variation
in the bite of financial frictions, which seems relevant in the context of the recent crisis. We revisit
this issue in Section 6, when we study the optimal policy response to a shock that increases the bite
of the borrowing constraint in our model.
6 Optimal Response to Fiscal and Financial Shocks
In this section we extend the analysis to a stochastic variant in order to explore the dynamic response
of the optimal policy to two kinds of exogenous disturbances: shocks to the level of government
spending; and shocks to the severity of the financial friction, as parameterized by ξ. These shocks
are assumed to follow independent Markov processes with finite supports and complete mixing.
Finally, as in Barro (1979) and AMSS, we restrict the government to issuing only one-period risk-
free debt, thus focusing on the realistic case where the government can not insulate its budget from
these shocks.
If the support of the underlying shocks is small enough (say, the shock can take only 2 values), we
can solve the full, non-linear, dynamic program for the planner’s problem in a similar manner as in
the deterministic benchmark. This approach, however, becomes computationally costly once we let
the support of the shock become large enough. We have thus opted to study a linear approximation
of the stochastic dynamics around the deterministic steady state.23
The key qualitative lessons of the deterministic benchmark survive: the optimal policy now
varies with the shocks, but for any given realization of the shock the policy rules have the same
shape as in Figure 1. Our earlier result regarding the determinacy of the steady state thus translates
to an invariant long-run distribution. In the remainder of this section we thus focus on documenting
the impulse responses of the optimal policy to the aforementioned two types of shocks, under the
same parametrization as in Table 1.
23Note that this approach is not valid in Ramsey policy exercises such as AMSS because the underlying deterministic
steady state is indeterminate and, accordingly, the stochastic dynamics have a unit root. By contrast, this approach
is valid in our case because the financial friction induces, in effect, a mean-reverting force.
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Fiscal shocks. We first consider a permanent change in government spending: we let gt follow a
random walk and study the impulse response of the optimal policy to a positive innovation in gt.
In the standard paradigm, tax smoothing requires that taxes increase immediately, permanently,
and by essentially the same amount as the increase in government spending.24 Consequently, the
deficit stays at zero, and the level of public debt remains at its initial value. Finally, employment
and output fall because of the increase in taxes, but they stay constant throughout time.
The aforementioned responses are illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 6. The solid lines, by
contrast, illustrate the dynamic responses of the optimal policy and the optimal allocation in our
model. As is evident from this figure, the optimal response is notably different in our model.
Figure 6: Permanent fiscal shock
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Note: Our model, Standard Paradigm.
The planner reacts by initially raising taxes more than one-to-one, that is, by running a surplus
and withdrawing public debt. By doing so, the planner reduces the aggregate quantity of collateral,
which in turn increases the bite of the collateral constraint. The allocation of capital is therefore
distorted and aggregate TFP falls, which, other things equal, means a reduction in welfare as well
as in tax revenue. However, by increasing the bite of the financial friction, the planner also raises
liquidity premia, which helps reduce interest-rate costs. In effect, the planner is “starving the
economy from liquidity” in order to push down interest rates and thereby limit the tax burden of
the shock.
24To be precise, these properties are exact in Barro (1979) but only approximately true in AMSS. The dashed lines
in Figures 6 and are drawn on the basis of Barro (1979) only to sharpen the illustration.
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Figure 7 repeats the exercise for the case of a transitory fiscal shock, namely for the case that
gt follows an AR(1) with autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.86 (as in US data). In the standard
paradigm, tax smoothing requires that taxes increase permanently and by as much as the innovation
in the annuity value of government spending. Since gt is mean-reverting, this translates to the
government running a deficit early on, accumulating a higher level of debt, and running surpluses
later on to pay for the interest-rate cost of the extra debt. Here, by contrast, the government
restrains the initial increase in deficits and public debt in order to induce higher liquidity premia
and lower interest-rate costs. In the long-run, public debt returns to its original steady-state value,
underscoring the mean-reversion force that the financial friction introduces in the Ramsey problem.
Figure 7: Transitory fiscal shock
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Note: Our model, Standard Paradigm.
In conclusion, whether the fiscal shock is permanent or transitory, there is considerably less
tax smoothing than in the standard model, and the tax burden of the shock is front-loaded: taxes
increase more in the present so as to to run smaller deficits than in the standard paradigm, and
thereby lower interest rates and enjoy lower taxes in the future.
Financial shocks. Figure 8 describes the effects of an adverse financial shock. We let ξt follow an
AR(1) process with autocorrelation coefficient 0.90 and study the response of optimal policy and of
the optimal allocation to a negative innovation in ξt. Note that this shock tightens credit, depresses
economic activity, raises liquidity premia, and pushes down interest rates—thus mimicking many of
the key stylized facts of the recent financial crisis.
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Figure 8: Adverse Financial Shock (ξ)
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When this shock occurs, the demand for public debt increases. The planner accommodates
the higher demand but not fully (as can be seen from the increase in the liquidity value of debt)
because of the future tax burden of higher debt; and she does so in a gradual fashion for reasons
of tax smoothing. With the level of government spending fixed, debt issuance is accompanied by
a reduction in the tax rate. As can be seen in the graph for the welfare cost of taxation (λ), the
financial shock represents “good news” for the government budget, as it makes debt more valuable
to the agents, suppressing interest-rate costs, and thus making a tax cut attractive. The partial
amelioration of the financial friction and the reduction in taxes imply that the recession triggered
by the adverse ξ shock is not as deep as it would have otherwise been. But it is bigger than what
it would have been if there were no concern for the servicing requirements of debt, in which case
enough public debt would have been issued so as to offset entirely the negative effect of the ξ shock
on the liquidity premium.
Figure 9 demonstrates these points by comparing the response of the economy under three differ-
ent policy regimes. The thick line corresponds to the case above where there is a trade off between
issuing new debt and facing higher servicing costs in the future due to distortionary taxation. The
thin line corresponds to the case where neither debt nor the tax rate are adjusted following the
shock and use of lump sum taxes is made in order to satisfy the government budget constraint.
The dotted line corresponds to the case where lump sum taxes can be used to finance any obliga-
tions arising from new public debt issuance. In this case, new debt issuance is not hindered by the
prospect of higher tax rates and the government has no reason to hold back and not issue as much
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Figure 9: Decomposing the Response to Adverse Financial Shock
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as it is needed in order to fully eliminate the effect of the financial shock on the liquidity premium
(that is, keep the premium at its steady state level). As can be seen, the severity of the recession
varies negatively with the level of public debt issued, with the most debt expansionary policy regime
resulting in negligible output losses relative to the other regimes. Consequently, our model’s impli-
cation regarding the relationship between public debt issuance and the level of economic activity
agrees with that of the old Keynesian models, but the mechanism is different.
Remark. While the financial shock has been represented as an exogenous change in ξ, we expect
alternative formalizations to deliver similar results. For example, consider Arellano, Bai and Kehoe
(2012) and Di Tella (2012). In these papers, a financial crisis is modeled as the byproduct of an
exogenous increase in the level of idiosyncratic risk rather than an exogenous tightening of the
collateral constraint. We can mimic this approach in our setting by keeping ξ fixed and introducing
instead a shock that increases the TFP difference between the two types of firms. In equilibrium,
this manifests itself as an increase in the wedge between the internal and the external return of
investment for the high-type firms. This kind of shock therefore triggers almost identical positive
and normative responses as the ξ shock we have studied here.
Alternatively, one may extend the model so as to allow the private sector to generate some
form of liquidity that is an imperfect substitute for public debt—think, e.g., of high-grade corporate
bonds—and model a financial shock as an adverse shock in the liquidity-producing capacity of that
sector. While we have not considered this possibility, we expect similar results as in the case of an
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exogenous shock to ξ. Such an extension also raises the following possibility. Stein (2012) argues
that the planner may wish to regulate and/or crowd out such privately-produced liquidity because
of fire-sale externalities. Our results indicate that the planner may sometimes wish to do so even in
the absence of such externalities, in order to increase his monopoly power in the market for liquidity
and thereby reduce the tax burden of servicing the public debt.
7 A model with frictions on the consumer side
The preceding analysis has focused on frictions on firms. We now show how our analysis extends
directly to a variant model where the liquidity premium on public debt originates from frictions on
the consumer side of the economy. This serves three purposes. First, it brings our framework closer
to Bewley (1977), Woodford (1990), Aiyagari (1994), and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). Second,
it connects our work to recent work that argues that the “great recession” is driven in part by tighter
borrowing constraints depressing consumer demand; see, e.g., Mian and Sufi (2011a,b), Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012), and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012). Last but not least, it facilitates a more
direct comparison of our results to the literature on the Friedman rule.
Model set-up. The economy is populated by a large number of ex-ante identical households
(consumers). Time is indexed by t ∈ N. Each period t is split in two sub-periods, the “morning”
and the “afternoon”. There is no aggregate uncertainty, but households are subject to idiosyncratic
income and/or taste shocks in the morning of each period.
The household’s preferences are given by
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU(cit, xit, hit; ζit)
]
(19)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, xit ∈ R+ and cit ∈ R denote consumption in, respectively,
the morning and the afternoon of period t, hit ∈ R+ denotes labor supply, ζit is an idiosyncratic
taste shock, and
U(c, x, h; ζ) ≡ c+ ζu(x)− v(h) (20)
The household faces two budget constraints per period, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.
The morning constraint is
xit + ptzit = eit
where zit is the quantity of private loans bought in the morning of period t, pt is their price, and
eit is an exogenous endowment shock. The afternoon constraint is
cit + qtbit+1 = (1− τt)wthit + bit + zit,
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where bit+1 is the quantity of bonds purchased in period t, qt is their price, wt is the wage rate, and
τt is the tax rate.25
The endowment and taste shocks are i.i.d. across agents and periods, and can take two possible
values, ζit ∈ {1, θ} and eit ∈ {1, δ}, where δ 6 1, θ > 1, and δ 6= θ. These shocks are proxies for
idiosyncratic variation in borrowing and saving attitudes: other things being equal, an agent who
receives the high taste shock and/or the low endowment shock in the morning has a higher desire
to borrow (or, a lower desire to save) than an agent who receives the opposite kind of shocks. To
simplify the exposition, we assume that the two shocks are perfectly correlated with one another, so
that there are only two types of consumers: “borrowers”, who receive (eit, ζit) = (δ, θ), and “savers”,
who receive (eit, ζit) = (1, 1). The corresponding probabilities of these two types are pi and 1 − pi,
with 0 < pi < 1.
If the amounts of borrowing and saving were unrestricted, the economy could attain first-best
outcomes (full insurance). We introduce financial frictions by assuming that the household faces a
ceiling φ > 0 on the amount of its future labor income that it can pledge as collateral. This implies
the following borrowing constraints:
−zit 6 bit + φ and − bit+1 6 φ. (21)
Note that the first constraint indicates that households can borrow in the morning by using their
bond holdings as collateral. Alternatively we could have assumed the households sell their bond
holdings during the morning in order to finance early consumption. The two specifications are
equivalent in our model, and we choose to talk of zit as collateralized borrowing only for exposition
purposes.
Finally, the government budget is given by
Bt + gt = qtBt+1 + τtYt
where Bt is the level of debt inherited from period t− 1, gt is the (exogenous) level of government
spending, Yt is aggregate income, and Bt+1 is newly issued debt.26
Remark. Our modeling strategy follows once again Lagos and Wright (2005) and Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2009) and avoids having the wealth distribution as a relevant state variable for
the equilibrium dynamics. At the same time, the introduction of idiosyncratic income and/or taste
shocks and the borrowing constraint embedded in (21) allows us to capture the essence of the role of
public debt in incomplete-market models such as Bewley (1977), Woodford (1990), Aiyagari (1994),
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1995), Challe and Ragot (2011), and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012): As
25Note that only income in the afternoon is assumed to be taxable; as long as ones limits the extent of lump-sum
taxation, this assumption’s sole purpose is to simplify the exposition.
26The assumption that the government operates (i.e., buys goods, collects taxes, and trades in financial markets)
only in the afternoon is made only for expositional simplicity.
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in these papers, issuing more public debt in our model helps consumers smooth consumption by
permitting them, in effect, to borrow against their future labor income.
Equilibrium. Solving the morning budget constraint for zit and substituting the result into the
afternoon constraint, we obtain the following “integrated” budget constraint for period t:
c˜it + qtbit+1 = (1− τt)hit + bit, (22)
where c˜it ≡ cit+ 1pt (xit−eit). Condition (22) is a familiar-looking budget constraint. The borrowing
constraint can be similarly restated as
1
pt
(xit − eit) 6 bit + φ
which highlights that the amount of early consumption a household can enjoy is restricted by the
bond holdings the household has accumulated by the beginning of the period.
The household’s optimization problem can thus be summarized by the following Lagrangian:
L ≡ E0
∑
t β
t
{
[cit + ζitu(xit)− v(hit)] + µit
[
bit + φ− 1pt (xit − eit)
]
+ νit
[
bit + (1− τt)hit − cit − 1pt (xit − eit)− qtbit+1
]}
Here, νit identifies the marginal value of wealth (the Lagrange multiplier on the integrated bud-
get constraint), while µit identifies the shadow value of liquidity (the multiplier on the morning
borrowing constraint).
Due to the linearity of preferences, the first-order condition with respect to cit gives νit = 1,
The first-order condition for bit+1 is then
qt = β(1 + Eitµit+1), (23)
which requires that the price of public debt be equated with the discount factor adjusted by the
shadow value of the borrowing constraint next period. Note that this is formally the same pricing
condition as in our baseline model. The nature of the financial friction is different—the borrowing
constraint inhibits consumption smoothing rather than capital reallocation—but its implication for
the pricing of public debt is the same.
The first-order conditions for xit and hit are:
ptζitu
′(xit) = 1 + µit
v′(hit) = 1− τt
where µit > 0, with µit = 0 whenever the borrowing constraint does not bind. The first condition
captures how the severity of the financial friction distorts consumption, whereas the second one
32
reveals that the friction does not affect labor-supply decisions.27
Note that, because of the linearity of preferences in afternoon consumption, we can easily guess
and verify that the labor-supply and morning consumption choices of any given household in any
given period are independent of the history of this household prior to that period. Furthermore,
without any loss of generality, we impose bit = bt for all i.28
Next, note that the morning borrowing constraint cannot bind for both types of households: if
that were the case, the resource constraint of the economy during the morning would be violated.
It is then straightforward to show that the constraint cannot bind for the first type of agents (the
patient, high-income ones), while it may or may not bind for constraint for the second type of agents
(the impatient, low-income ones). This is because agents of the first type necessarily save, while
those of the second type necessarily borrow.
With these facts in mind, we henceforth refer to the first type of agents as “savers” and the latter
as “borrowers”. We accordingly index by “s” all the variables for the savers and by “b” those for the
borrowers, and denote with µt the shadow cost of the borrowing constraint for the borrowers. We
can then reach the following characterization of the equilibrium.
Lemma 5. A sequence of tax and debt policies {τt, bt}∞t=0, of bond prices {qt}∞t=0, and of allocations
{xst , xbt , cst , cbt , ht}∞t=0 constitutes a competitive equilibrium if and only if there exists a non-negative
sequence {µt}∞t=0 such that the following hold:
θu′(xbt) = (1 + µt)u
′(xst ), (24)
u′(xst )(x
b
t − δ) 6 φ+ bt, µt > 0, [u′(xst )(xbt − δ)− (φ+ bt)]µt = 0 (25)
v′(ht) = 1− τt, qt = β(1 + piµt+1), (26)
pixst + (1− pi)xbt = e¯, picst + (1− pi)cbt + gt = ht, qtbt+1 = bt + gt − τtht (27)
where e¯ ≡ 1− pi + piδ.
27This last property hinges on two simplifying assumptions that have been hard-wired in the model. Namely, that
all of the labor income is received in the afternoon and that none of it is pledgeable in the morning. Were we to relax
either of these assumptions then tighter borrowing constraints would boost labor supply. Note then that our baseline
model contains the opposite effect on the demand for labor: There, tighter constraints, by distorting the allocation of
capital, contributed to a reduction in the aggregate demand for labor and thereby in equilibrium employment. These
observations extend to richer macroeconomic models with financial frictions: whether tighter credit contributes to
higher or lower employment depends on whether the friction aﬄicts the firms or the consumers. In any event, while
this issue may be essential for understanding the positive effects of financial frictions, it is not essential for our results.
28Similarly to our baseline model, the linearity of preferences implies that the dynamic pattern of bond holdings
and afternoon consumption is indeterminate at the individual level: at the equilibrium interest rate, each agent is
indifferent between consuming in the afternoon of one day or any other day. Restricting attention to symmetric
equilibria where bit = bt for all i is then without any loss of optimality.
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Condition (24) identifies µt as the wedge between the marginal utility of borrowers and savers
or, equivalently, as the multiplier on the collateral constraint of the borrowers. Condition (25) states
this constraint and the complementary slackness condition between this constraint and its multiplier.
Finally, condition (26) contains the optimality condition for labor and the Euler condition, while
condition (27) contains the resource and budget constraints.
Note that, whenever the collateral constraint binds (µt+1 > 0), the price of public debt in the
previous period, qt−1, exceeds β by an amount proportional to µt. This implies a reduced cost of
borrowing for the government. As in our baseline model, this reflects the interaction of public debt
and financial frictions: Public debt commands a liquidity premium because it relaxes the bite of
borrowing constraints.
The Ramsey problem. Let xb? and xs? be the first-best levels of morning consumption. These
are given by the solution to
θu′(xb?) = u′(xs?) and pixb? + (1− pi)xs? = e¯
Next, let V ? ≡ β(piθu(xb?)+(1−pi)u′(xs?)) be the discounted expected utility of morning consump-
tion at the first best. Finally, define b? as the minimal amount of debt holdings that is needed in
order for the first-best allocation not to violate the collateral constraint:
b? ≡ u′(xs?)(xb? − δ)− φ
Now, pick an arbitrary period t and suppose that bt+1 > b?, meaning that the collateral constraint
will be slack in the next period. It follows that xst+1 = xs?, xbt+1 = xb?, µt+1 = 0, and qt = β. If
instead bt+1 < b?, the morning allocation in period t+ 1 is distorted away from the first best, and
the distortion is higher the lower bt+1. The associated premium µt and the resulting price of debt
qt can be expressed as increasing functions of bt+1: a lower bt+1 implies a bigger gap between the
marginal utilities of a borrower and a saver, and therefore a higher liquidity premium and a higher
price of public debt. Based on these observations, we can derive the following result.
Lemma 6. There exist continuous functions Q and V such that
qt = Q(bt+1) and βpiu(xst+1) + β(1− pi)θu(xbt+1)) = V (bt+1)
Furthermore, these functions satisfy Q(b) = β and V (b) = V ? whenever b > b?, while Q(b) > β,
Q′(b) > 0, V (b) < V ?, and V ′(b) > 0 whenever b < b?.
Let ct denote aggregate consumption: ct ≡ picst + (1 − pi)cbt . The resource constraint can then
be restated as ct + gt = ht. Now, take the government budget constraint and replace gt from the
resource constraint and τt from the optimality condition for labor. We then get
[ct − v′(ht)ht] + qtbt+1 = bt,
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which represents the implementability constraint in recursive form. Combining these facts with
Lemma 6, we conclude that the Ramsey problem can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4. The Ramsey plan solves
max
∞∑
t=0
βt [ct − v(ht) + V (bt+1)] (28)
s.t. Q(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + [v
′(ht)ht − ct] (29)
ct + gt = ht (30)
The interpretation of Lemma 6 and Proposition 4 is simple. The function V identifies the
indirect utility of holding public debt; the function Q captures the associated liquidity premium;
the objective in (28) measures ex-ante welfare; (29) is the implementability constraint in recursive
form; and (30) is the resource constraint.
The Ramsey problem of the present model is therefore formally similar to the Ramsey problem
in models with money in the utility function. Alternatively, and complementarily, one can think
of our “morning” and “afternoon” consumptions as, respectively, the “cash” and “credit” goods in
models with a cash-in-advance constraint. Following this line of analogies, one can perhaps also
think of our baseline model as a model with money in the production function, in the sense that
public debt affects the allocation of capital and thereby aggregate output in our baseline model.
This last analogy, however, is not exact, in part because the planner’s problem in Proposition 3 has
the price rather than the quantity of debt showing up in aggregate TFP. The variant of this section,
by contrast, permits an exact isomorphism to the pertinent literature on the Friedman rule, thus
helping sharpen the comparison between our results and those of that literature. We return to this
issue below.
Results. Let us now concentrate on the Ramsey problem in Proposition 4. This problem can be
solved similarly to that in our baseline model. See the appendix for details. In fact, the only formal
difference is that we can now work directly with bt as the relevant state variable, instead of the
transformed variable zt that we used in the baseline model.
The resulting policy rules are illustrated in Figure 10 for a particular parametrization.29 As it
is evident from this figure, the economy exhibits a unique and globally stable steady state. As in
the baseline model, this steady state obtains at a lower level of debt than the threshold level, bˆ,
29The discount factor is β = 0.96. We set the curvature parameter of the utility function to σ = 2 and the inverse
Frisch elasticity is set to 1. The labor dis-utility parameter ϑ is set such that hours worked are 1 in an equilibrium,
while the utility parameter accounting for the relative impatience of borrowers,θ, is set to 3. The borrowing constraint
parameter is set to 0. We assume that there are as many patient as impatient agents (pi = 0.5). The total endowment
in the morning good is set to 1 and government expenditures are 20% of steady state GDP.
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at which the demand for liquidity would have been satiated. In other words, the Friedman rule
does not apply. Moreover, one can see, by comparing Figure 10 to Figure 1, that the shape of the
policy rules and the associated transitional dynamics are nearly indistinguishable from those in our
baseline model.
Figure 10: Decision Rules
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
b
t
b t+
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
b
t
τ t
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
b
t
q t+
1
A similar pattern emerges when we consider the comparative statics of the steady state, or when
we add shocks and consider the associated impulse responses. We conclude that the two models
behave very similarly. And although both models are highly stylized, this near-equivalence suggests
more generally that the insights offered in this paper need not be overly sensitive to the precise
details of the specification of the micro-foundations of the liquidity demand for public debt. That
is, whether the friction is on the firm side or the consumer side of the economy, the same qualitative
properties of the policy responses obtain.
On the Friedman Rule We now return to the comparison of our results to those obtained in
the literature on the Friedman rule. As noted earlier, a key result in this literature is that the
Friedman rule is optimal in a large class of monetary economies, irrespectively of whether taxation
is distortionary or not. In the models we have studied, by contrast, the analogue of the Friedman
rule does not apply, despite the fact that one can reinterpret public debt as a form of money. The
explanation behind this finding builds on two observations.
First and foremost, the pertinent literature on the Friedman rule assumes that only a certain
subset of government liabilities can offer liquidity services: in that literature, money offers liquidity
services, but government bonds do not. This gives the planner a profitable “arbitrage” opportunity:
by substituting money for debt the planner can meet the economy’s demand for liquidity without
affecting his overall liabilities and, therefore, without interfering with tax smoothing. This in turn
guarantees that, for the class of economies for which the Friedman rule holds, the planner finds it
optimal to satiate the economy’s demand for liquidity, not only in the long run, but also in every
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period after the very first one. In particular, the planner floods the economy with lots of nominal
money in the first period in order to collect a lot of seigniorage, but thereafter sets a zero nominal
interest rate so as to satiate the economy’s demand for real money balances. What is more, the
first-period seigniorage is saved in the form of a lower—possibly negative—quantity of governments
bonds in order to pay for lower taxes in the future, as well for the continuous money withdrawal
(negative inflation) that is required in order to implement the Friedman rule.
In this paper, by contrast, we have effectively assumed that all government liabilities offer
liquidity services. The aforementioned arbitrage-like argument is therefore no longer applicable.
Instead, if the planner wishes to supply more liquidity to the economy, he can do so only by raising
his overall debt obligation. By itself, this guarantees that, even if the planner finds it optimal to
satiate the economy’s demand for liquidity in the long-run, he may not do so in the short-run.30
Second, even in the pertinent literature, the validity of the Friedman rule ultimately hinges on
special assumptions about the micro-foundations of the demand for money (final vs intermediate
good etc) and on the menu of available tax instruments. The analogues to these assumptions are
violated in our model, which help us understand why the analogue of the Friedman rule is violated
in our model, not only in the short run, but also in the long run.
To elaborate on this point, consider the class of models with money in the utility function.
Suppose that per-period utility is given by U(c) + V (m), where c denotes consumption and m
denotes real money balances, and let both U and V take a power (or isoelastic) form, with respective
elasticities σc and σm. Then, it is well known (e.g., Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1996) that the
Friedman rule holds whenever σc < σm but fails whenever σc > σm. This helps explain why the
analogue of the Friedman rule does not apply in the Bewley-like variant we studied in the previous
section: this model essentially has σc =∞ > σm.
Alternatively, consider the class of models in which money is an intermediate input. In this
case, the optimality of the Friedman rule hinges on whether the government can appropriately tax
firm profits. A similar property holds in our baseline model. Recall that our model can be roughly
interpreted as a model in which the quantity of debt affects the aggregate production function.31
To summarize the preceding discussion, one can think of variants of our models in which the
planner finds it optimal to satiate the economy’s demand for public debt in the long run. It
nevertheless remains an open question whether this possibility is empirically relevant, or whether
30This observation is consistent with the results obtained when we studied the modification of our baseline model
that blocked the effect of liquidity on interest rates. As shown in Figure 3, this modification forced the Friedman rule
to hold in the long run (steady state) of our model. Yet, the Friedman rule failed to be satisfied along the transition
path to the steady state, precisely because of the reasons offered above.
31Note that there are two possible definitions of profits in our model, depending on whether the cost of capital is
evaluated at its market price (external return) or its shadow value (internal return). Allowing for the appropriation
of all profits under the first definition, which seems the most natural in practice, does not restore the optimality of
the Friedman rule. But it does under the second definition.
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it applies to models with rich heterogeneity, such as Aiyagari (1994). In any event, for the reasons
explained above, the theory appears to predict robustly that the planner does not find it optimal
to satiate the economy’s demand for public debt in the short run. Consequently, the qualitative
properties of our results regarding the optimal policy response to fiscal and financial shocks apply
independent of the debt satiation properties of the steady state.32
8 Conclusion
The great recession has revived interest in the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions
and the potential role of fiscal policies in alleviating such frictions. In this paper we have explored
the idea that the issuance of more public debt can help on this front by increasing the aggregate
quantity of collateral or enhancing private liquidity.
To do so, we revisited the Ramsey policy paradigm in the presence of a financial friction on
either the production or the consumption side of the economy. Our analysis produced three key
results relative to the standard Ramsey paradigm. First, the steady-state level of debt is no longer
indeterminate (in the sense of moving one-to-one with initial conditions); rather, it is pinned down
by balancing the inefficiencies caused by the financial friction with the budgetary benefit of lower
interest rates on public debt. Second, perfect tax smoothing is no longer optimal; rather, it is
optimal to front-load the tax burden of fiscal shocks so as to induce the desirable movement in
liquidity premia and interest rates. Third, optimal debt management helps reduce the overall tax
burden of adverse fiscal shocks, as well as stabilize economic activity against financial shocks.
There are several possibilities regarding extensions of this work. First, the framework used here
is highly stylized. Embedding our qualitative insights in richer incomplete-markets models, which
allow for more realistic heterogeneity and more realistic dynamics, could yield useful quantification
of the relevant trade offs.
Second, in this paper we have abstracted from the optimal maturity structure of public debt.
Long-term debt appears to possess a smaller liquidity premium and a lower price than short-term
debt, but it also provides the government with more insurance against short-term interest-rate
fluctuations. Furthermore, at the same time that the financial crisis has raised the demand for
US-issued debt and has kept the cost of US borrowing low, concerns are accumulating about the
country’s long-term fiscal prospects. Extensions of our model may provide a tractable framework
for studying how these considerations affect the optimal size and maturity structure of public debt.
Finally, one could embed our analysis into a new-Keynesian model so as to study how optimal
debt management (or, the optimal timing of transfers) can substitute for monetary policy when
32To be precise, this presumes, of course, that the planner does not start in the short run with a level of debt
already above the satiation level.
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the zero-lower bound binds because of financial frictions. This would complement Krugman and
Eggertsson (2012), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012), and Buera and Nicolini (2012), who have argued
that the existence of borrowing constraints is the key reason why the zero-lower bound became
binding during the great recession, but have not studied the possibility that public debt or transfers
might provide a more direct remedy to the underlying problem.33
33This is related to Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles (2012), who have abstracted from borrowing constraints but
have sought to identify fiscal policies that can substitute for monetary policy when the zero-lower bound binds.
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Appendix A: The Baseline Model
This appendix gives a detailed derivation of the equilibrium and the planner’s problem for our
baseline model.
Equilibrium characterization (Lemma 1 and Proposition 1). From the fact that both types
of firms equate the marginal product of labor with the wage rate and the market-clearing condition
for labor, we can express the equilibrium labor inputs as follows:
nLt =
(kLt )
α
1−θ
ut
ht and nHt =
A
1
1−θ (kHt )
α
1−θ
ut
ht
where
ut ≡ piA
1
1−θ (kHt )
α
1−θ + (1− pi)(kLt )
α
1−θ .
Letting RHt and RLt denote the marginal products of capital (aka internal returns) in the two types
of firms and Yt = piyHt + (1− pi)yLt the aggregate output, we obtain
RHt = αA
1
1−θ (kHt )
α
1−θ−1
(
ht
ut
)θ
(31)
RLt = α(k
L
t )
α
1−θ−1
(
ht
ut
)θ
(32)
wt = θ
(
ut
ht
)1−θ
(33)
Yt = u
1−θ
t h
θ
t (34)
We thus obtain aggregate TFP as
TFPt ≡ Yt
καt h
θ
t
= u1−θt κ
−α
t =
{
piA
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ
t + (1− pi)
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ
}1−θ
= Γ(xt)
where the function Γ the same as in (7),
xt ≡ kHt /κt, kLt /κt =
1− pixt
1− pi , and κt = pik
H
t + (1− pi)kLt
Note that
Γ′(xt) = α
{
piA
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ−1
t − pi
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ−1
}
Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ
Aggregate output and the marginal product of capital (the internal return) in the two types of firms
are the given as follows:
yt = u
1−θ
t h
θ
t = Γ(xt)κ
α
t h
θ
t
wt = θΓ(xt)κ
α
t h
θ−1
t
RHt = αA
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ−1
t Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ κα−1t h
θ
t
RLt = α
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ−1
Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ κα−1t h
θ
t
43
By implication, the wedge between the internal returns of the two types of firms is given by
RHt −RLt =
1
pi
Γ′(xt)κα−1t h
θ
t .
For a given output-to-capital ratio, the wedge is therefore a one-to-one transformation of the TFP
distortion, as measured by the derivative Γ evaluated at the underlying allocation of capital: the
bigger the gap between xt and x∗, the bigger the aforementioned wedge and the associated TFP
distortion.
We now proceed to express the equilibrium allocation as a function of the price of debt. Using
the fact that (pt − ξ)µt = RHt −RLt , we get
(pt − ξ)µt = 1
pi
Γ′(xt)κα−1t h
θ
t = α
{
A
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ−1
t −
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ−1
}
Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ κα−1t h
θ
t
Solving β(1 + piµt) = qt−1 for µt and substituting the solution into (pt − ξ)µt along with the fact
that pt = 1/qt−1, we get
(pt − ξ)µt = (1− ξqt−1)(qt−1 − β)
βpiqt−1
.
Combining the last two equations we infer
(1− ξqt−1)(qt−1 − β)
βpiqt−1
= α
{
A
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ−1
t −
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ−1
}
Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ κα−1t h
θ
t .
At the same time, using the facts that pt = 1/qt−1 and pt = 1− δ +RLt , we get
1− (1− δ)qt−1 = RLt qt−1 = qt−1α
(
1− pixt
1− pi
) α
1−θ−1
Γ(xt)
− θ
1−θ κα−1t h
θ
t .
Combing the last two equations we conclude
A
1
1−θ x
α
1−θ−1
t −
(
1−pixt
1−pi
) α
1−θ−1(
1−pixt
1−pi
)
α
1−θ−1
=
(1− ξqt−1)(qt−1 − β)
βpi(1− (1− δ)qt−1)
or equivalently
(1− pi)xt
1− pixt = Φ(qt−1) ≡
(
βpiA
1
1−θ (1− (1− δ)qt−1)
βpi(1− (1− δ)qt−1) + (qt−1 − β)(1− ξqt−1)
) 1−θ
1−α−θ
Combining with the fact that pixt + (1− pi)
(
1−pixt
1−pi
)
= 1, we conclude that
xt = X(qt−1) ≡ Φ(qt−1)
1− pi + piΦ(qt−1)
The above is defined as long as qt−1 > β. Furthermore, Φ(β) = A
1
1−α−θ and
X(β) = x? = arg max
x
Γ(x)
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That is, X(β) gives the first-best allocation of capital. For all q > β, X(q) < x?.
Given the above result, we have that
yt = Ψ(qt−1)καt h
θ
t
where Ψ(q) = Γ(X(q)). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Similarly, from (pt − ξ)µt = 1piΓ′(X(qt−1))κα−1t hθt , we get
µt = M(qt−1)κα−1t h
θ
t
where
M(q) ≡ qΓ
′(X(q))
pi(1− ξq)
Proposition 1 then follows from the above results and the analysis in the main text.
The welfare objective. The welfare function takes the form
W0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ct − ϑ h
1+ν
t
1 + ν
}
Using the aggregate resource constraint, we obtain
Wt =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
yt − gt − κt+1 + (1− δ)κt − ϑ h
1+ν
t
1 + ν
}
=
{
y0 + (1− δ)κ0 − g0 − ϑ h
1+ν
0
1 + ν
}
+
∞∑
t=1
βt
{
yt − gt − 1− β(1− δ)
β
κt − ϑ h
1+ν
t
1 + ν
}
=
{
y0 + (1− δ)κ0 − g0 − ϑ h
1+ν
0
1 + ν
}
+ βΩ1
where Ω1 is given recursively by the following:
Ωt =
{
yt − gt − 1− β(1− δ)
β
κt − ϑ h
1+ν
t
1 + ν
}
+ βΩt+1 (35)
subject to the the equilibrium conditions we derived in the previous section. Our characterization
in the main text focuses on the maximization of Ω1, putting aside the (trivial) period-0 allocation.
The Ramsey problem without frictions (Lemma 2 and Proposition 2). In the absence of
a financial friction, we have qt = β and Γ(xt) = Γ?. Furthermore, the optimal savings are given by
the level of κt that maximizes
Γ?καt h
θ
t −
1− β(1− δ)
β
κt.
It follows that κt = χh
θ
1−α
t , where χ ≡
(
αβΓ?
1−β(1−δ)
) 1
1−α .
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Defining the transformed variables c˜t ≡ ct+kt+1− 1βkt and y˜t ≡ yt+(1−δ)kt− 1βkt, the resource
constraint reduces to
c˜t + gt = y˜t
At the optimal capital decision, y˜t is given by
y˜t = Γ
?χαh
θ
1−α
t −
1− β(1− δ)
β
χh
θ
1−α
t = f(ht)
where f(h) ≡ ∆hη, ∆ ≡ Γ?χα − 1−β(1−δ)β χ = (1− α)1−β(1−δ)αβ χ , and η ≡ θ1−α .
Finally, since qt = β, the intertemporal government budget constraint writes
b0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(τtwtht − gt)
Using the labor supply condition v′(ht) = (1 − τt)wt and, from eq. (35), the labor demand wt =
θyt/ht, this can be rewritten as
b0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(θyt − v′(ht)ht − gt)
Note yt = χ
αΓ?
∆ y˜t and
χαΓ?
∆ =
1
1−α , so that θyt = ηy˜t, while by the resource constraint y˜t = c˜t + gt.
Using these facts, the implementability constraint can finally be stated as
b0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(ηc˜t − v′(ht)ht − (1− η)gt)
where η ≡ θ1−α . The Ramsey problem therefore reduces to the following:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt (c˜t − v(ht))
s.t. b0 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(ηc˜t − v′(ht)ht − (1− η)gt)
c˜t + gt = f(ht)
where v(ht) ≡ ϑh
1+ν
t
1+ν in our benchmark case. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The set of first order conditions is then given by
θt = 1 + ηλ
θtf
′(ht) = v′(ht) + λ[v′(ht) + htv′′(ht)]
Therefore, ht = h0 solves
(1 + ηλ)f ′(ht) = v′(ht) + λ[v′(ht) + htv′′(ht)]
Therefore, τt = τ0 = 1 =
v′(h0)
f ′(h0) , yt = y0 = f(h0), kt = k0 = χh
ζ
0 and bt = b0. This establishes
Proposition 2.
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The Ramsey problem with frictions (Lemmas 3-4 and Proposition 3). We now explain
the details behind Proposition 3. First, we characterize the subset of implementable allocations for
which the borrowing constraint does not bind; we call this the “unconstrained regime”. Next, we
characterize the complementary subset in which the constraint binds; we call this the “constrained
regime”. Finally, we complete the transformation of the overall Ramsey problem in terms of the
low-dimension program in Proposition 3.
The unconstrained regime. In the unconstrained regime, µt = 0, qt−1 = β and pt = 1β . This
implies that RHt = RLt . The allocation of both capital and labor is therefore first-best efficient, and
is given by
nHt =
A
1
1−α−θ
1 + piA
1
1−α−θ
ht n
L
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1
(1− pi)(1 + piA 11−α−θ )
ht
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A
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1
(1− pi)(1 + piA 11−α−θ )
κt
Plugging these results in ut, yt, wt and Rt = RHt = RLt we obtain
ut = (1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−
α
1−θ κ
α
1−θ
t
yt = (1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−α−θκαt h
θ
t
wt = θ(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−α−θκαt h
θ−1
t
Rt = α(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−α−θκα−1t h
θ
t
Aggregate labor and capital are then given by the solution to
1
β
= α(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−α−θκα−1t h
θ
t + 1− δ
ϑhνt = (1− τt)θ(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )1−α−θκαt h
θ−1
t
which leads to
κt = Γk(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
ht = Γh(1− τt)
1−α
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
where
Γk =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) 1+ν−θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )
(1+ν)(1−α−θ)
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(
θ
ϑ
) θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
Γh =
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )
1−α−θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(
θ
ϑ
) 1−α
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
From this solution, all variables entering the utility can be obtained as functions of the tax rate
alone—the level of debt per se is not affecting welfare because the collateral constraint is not binding.
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Furthermore, tax revenue can be obtained as
τtwtht = Γwhτt(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
where
Γwh = θ
(
αβ
1− β(1− δ)
) α(1+ν)
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )
(1+ν)(1−α−θ)
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
(
θ
ϑ
) θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
Hence, with the transformed state variable defined as zt ≡ bt − gt − τtwtht, we get
bt = zt − gt + Γwhτt(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
The threshold debt level that makes the borrowing constraint bind is given by solving
kHt =
κt − βbt
1− ξβ
with respect to bt. This gives the threshold level as
b?t =
(
1− ξβ
β
A
1
1−α−θ
1 + piA
1
1−α−θ
− 1
β
)
Γk(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
The unconstrained case then applies if and only if bt > b?t , or equivalently zt > z?t , with
z?t ≡ gt +
[(
(1− ξβ)A 11−α−θ
β(1 + piA
1
1−α−θ )
− 1
β
)
Γk − Γwhτt
]
(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
Note that since ν > 0 and 0 < α+ θ < 1 we have (1−α)(1 + ν)− θ >. Therefore, z?t is a decreasing
function of τt. The intuition is that, when the tax rate is higher, the supply of labor is lower,
implying that the marginal product of capital and the efficient capital input are also lower; but then
the level of debt needed in order for the constraint not to bind is also lower.
Finally, the government budget constraint can be rewritten in terms of z as
qt−1
(
zt − gt + Γwhτt(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ
)
= zt−1
Given that qt = β in the unconstrained case, the above can be restated as
T (τt) = zt−1 − βzt + βgt
βΓwh
where T (τt) ≡ τt(1− τt)
θ
(1−α)(1+ν)−θ identifies the Laffer curve, that is, the equilibrium tax revenue
as a function of the tax rate. Since (1 − α)(1 + ν) − θ > 0, we have T ′(τt) > 0 if and only if
τt < τ
? ≡ 1− θ(1−α)(1+ν) . The set of solutions for the preceding equation is therefore non-empty if
and only
zt > zt−1 + βgt − βΓwhT (τ?)
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For any value below this threshold, the equation admits no real solution. Above it, the equation
admits two solutions, but the relevant one is the one that lies on the upward sloping part of the
Laffer curve, that is, the unique solution that is less than τ?. By using this solution in all other
quantities, we express all quantities in the unconstrained case as a function of (zt−1, zt).
The Constrained Regime. In the constrained regime, µt > 0 and the borrowing constraint binds.
Using the equation for the wage and the labor supply decision, one obtains
ht =
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) 1
1+ν−θ
u
1−θ
1+ν−θ
t
Plugging this result in the wage , output, tax revenues and interest rates, we obtain
wt = θ
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ−1
1+ν−θ
u
ν(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
t
yt =
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
t
τtwtht = θτt
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
t
RHt = αA
1
1−θ kHt
α
1−θ−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t
RLt = αk
L
t
α
1−θ−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t
Then, from the definition of the Lagrange multiplier µt and the price of borrowings, pt, we get
µt =
RHt −RLt
pt − ξ =
αqt−1
1− ξqt−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t
(
A
1
1−θ kHt
α
1−θ−1 − kLt
α
1−θ−1
)
and
pt = R
L
t + 1− δ = αkLt
α
1−θ−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t + 1− δ
Using these last 2 equations in
qt−1 = β(1 + piµt)
qt−1pt = 1
we obtain the following system of equations:
αqt−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t
(
A
1
1−θ kHt
α
1−θ−1 − kLt
α
1−θ−1
)
=
(qt−1 − β)(1− ξqt−1)
βpi
(36)
αqt−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
u
− νθ
1+ν−θ
t k
L
t
α
1−θ−1 = 1− (1− δ)qt−1 (37)
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Taking the ratio of these two equations, we obtain
kHt =
(
βpiA
1
1−θ (1− (1− δ)qt−1)
βpi(1− (1− δ)qt−1) + (qt−1 − β)(1− ξqt−1)
) 1−θ
1−α−θ
kLt = Φ(qt−1)k
L
t
Using it in the definition of ut, we get
ut = (1 + piA
1
1−θΦ(qt−1)
α
1−θ )kLt
α
1−θ
Plugging this result in (37), we get
αqt−1
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
(1 + piA
1
1−θΦ(qt−1)
α
1−θ )−
νθ
1+ν−θ kLt
− (1−α)(1+ν)−θ
1+ν−θ = 1− (1− δ)qt−1
such that
kLt =
(
αqt−1
1− (1− δ)qt−1
) 1+ν−θ
(1+ν)(1−α)−θ
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
(1+ν)(1−α)−θ
(1 + piA
1
1−θΦ(qt−1)
α
1−θ )
− νθ
(1+ν)(1−α)−θ
or identically
kLt = Ψs(qt−1)
It then follows that
kHt = Φ(qt−1)Ψs(qt−1) = Ψe(qt−1)
and
ut = (1 + piA
1
1−θΦ(qt−1)
α
1−θ )Ψs(qt−1)
α
1−θ = Ψx(qt−1)
Aggregate capital is then given by
κt = piΨe(qt−1) + (1− pi)Ψs(qt−1) = Ψk(qt−1)
while tax revenues take the form
τtwtht = θτt
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
Ψx(qt−1)
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
such that
bt = zt − gt + θτt
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
Ψx(qt−1)
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
Plugging these results in the borrowing constraint, we obtain an equation for qt−1 as a function of
zt and τt
Ψe(qt−1)(1− ξqt−1) = Ψk(qt−1) + qt−1
(
zt − gt + θτt
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
Ψx(qt−1)
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
)
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Once we have qt−1 = Q(zt, τt), we have all the other quantities of the model in the constrained
regime. As in the unconstrained case, we can express the constrained regime in terms of (zt−1, zt)
by using the additional equation
qt−1
(
zt − gt + θτt
(
θ(1− τt)
ϑ
) θ
1+ν−θ
Ψx(qt−1)
(1+ν)(1−θ)
1+ν−θ
)
= zt−1
All variables entering the utility function are therefore expressed as a function of the tax rate and
zt. This completes the proofs of Lemmas 3-4, and Proposition 3.
Algorithm. The algorithm we use to numerically solve the Ramsey problem in Proposition 3 is
based on a standard value-function iteration.
First, we setup a grid of 5000 nodes for the pairs (τt, zt) and obtain all quantities of the model
for each pair in the grid. We therefore obtain the instantaneous utility as a function of (τt, zt).
Next, we setup a grid for zt−1, and for each point in this grid and solve
Q(zt, τt)B(zt, τt) = zt−1
for τt as a function of the pair (zt−1, zt). (At this point, we make sure that the so-obtainted τt lies
on the upward sloping part of the Laffer curve.) Using this result, we can express the utility as a
function U of the pairs (zt−1, zt). We interpolate using splines. We finally numerically solve for the
value function by iterating on the following contraction mapping:
T V (z) = max
z′
{U(z, z′) + βV (z′)}
Appendix B: The Bewley-like Variant
This appendix considers the variant studied in Section 6. Lemma 5 follows from the discussion in
the main text. Here we provide a detailed derivation of the results in Lemma 6. Proposition 4 then
follows directly from Lemma 6.
As explained in the main text (see Lemma 5), an equilibrium of the Bewley-like variant of the
model satisfies equations (24)–(27). From (25) and (27), we have
u′(xst+1)
(
e− pixst+1
1− pi
)
= φ+ bt+1
from which we obtain
xst+1 = Γ
s(bt+1)
using (27) we obtain
xbt+1 =
e− piΓs(bt+1)
1− pi = Γ
b(bt+1)
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Using (24) and (26), we then get
qt = β
(
1− pi + piθu
′(Γb(bt+1))
u′(Γs(bt+1))
)
= Q(bt+1)
We then obtain immediately
βpiu(xst+1) + β(1− pi)u(xbt+1) = βpiu(Γs(bt+1)) + β(1− pi)u(Γb(bt+1)) = V (bt+1)
Note that when the financial constraint does not bite, we have µt+1 = 0, such that, as can be seen
directly from (26), qt = β. Furthermore, (24) reduces to
u′(xst+1) = θu
′(xbt+1)⇐⇒ xst+1 = θ˜xbt+1
where θ˜ = u′−1(θ). Plugging it in the morning resource constraint (27), we immediately get
xbt+1 = x
b? =
e
piθ˜ + 1− pi
xst+1 = x
s? =
eθ˜
piθ˜ + 1− pi
such that V (bt+1) = V ? with
V ? = βpiu
(
e
piθ˜ + 1− pi
)
+ β(1− pi)u
(
eθ˜
piθ˜ + 1− pi
)
such a situation emerges when
bt+1 > b
?
where b? = u′(xs?)(xb?− δ)−φ is the level of debt below which the financial constraint binds. This
completes the proof of Lemma 6. Proposition 4 is then immediate.
Finally, the algorithm for the numerical solution of the planner’s problem is similar to that in
the baseline model.
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